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Section I: Introduction 
The relationship of Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) to mysticism has been investigated in a 
surprisingly lopsided manner by scholars.  That Dante was influenced by mystics who lived 
before him is not seriously in question, and not merely because Dante himself claimed to have 
read, and to have been writing in the tradition of, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1113) and Richard 
of St. Victor (1110-1173).1  Writing in 1913, the scholar of Italian literature Edmund Gardner 
cataloged 182 passages in the Divina Commedia that appear to be parallels to passages in the 
writings of mystics Dante would likely have read, most notably Pseudo-Dionysius (fl. early 6th 
c.—hereafter Dionysius), Bernard, and Mechtilde of Hackethorne (1240-1298).2  Dante was no 
mere copyist, however—he did not lift catchy-sounding passages from earlier writings and insert 
them into his own poetry.  He understood the ideas of those mystics and wove them into the 
fabric of his epic.  Recently, for example, Lino Pertile has persuasively argued that Dante, like 
Bernard of Clairvaux, understood the beatific vision not as the end of mystical attainment, but 
the beginning thereof, the beginning of the call to continued thirst for union with the divine.3  
Scholars who address the question of the mystics who influenced Dante are attempting to answer 
a fundamental and important question about Dante’s relationship to mysticism.  But the same 
body of work also raises other questions, two of which I aim to answer in this thesis.  The first of 
these other two questions is this: was Dante himself a mystic, and if so, what can we begin to say 
about the nature of his mysticism?  As I argue in this thesis, this question should be answered in 
the affirmative.  Dante was, indeed, a mystic who recognized that desire is the engine of progress 
on the mystical path, and that desire must be transformed before union with God can be 
                                                 
1 Letter to Can Grande, pp 212-3. 
2 Gardner, Mystics, pp 342-8. 
3 Pertile, Desire, pp 151-3. 
3 
 
achieved.  As a result of these features of Dante’s mystical thought, he interpolated an 
investigation of sin on the journey of a contemplative to direct experience of God.  The second 
question to be answered in this thesis is an obvious development from the first question: as a 
mystic, did Dante influence mystics who came after him?  In this thesis, I shall present evidence 
that Dante’s innovations can be recognized in the thought of later mystics.4 
The only sources we have for determining whether Dante should be thought of as a 
mystic are his own writings.  Some of his earlier works are redolent with phrases that suggest, on 
an intuitive level, a mystical depth to Dante’s thought.  At the start of the Vita Nuova, Dante 
writes “In my book of memory…there comes a chapter with the rubric Incipit Vita Nova.5 It is 
my intention to copy into this little book the words I find written under that heading—if not all of 
them, at least the essence of their meaning.”6  As the text unfolds, readers learn that the “new 
life” refers, apparently, to Dante’s dedication to the god of love, Amor.  The love in question is, 
within the confines of the Vita Nuova, both complicated in its texture and simple in that it has a 
single (indeed, singular) object: Beatrice.  Like poets before him, Dante wrote about Beatrice, 
and his love for her, as having (in the words of Robert Hollander) “some positive relation to a 
more-than-sensual goodness, or even as though [she] possessed a certain similarity to angelic 
perfection that might lead from an erotic impulse to a higher understanding.”7  But, as Hollander 
goes on to observe, Dante exceeds previous poets in placing Beatrice within the mystic rose of 
the thirty-second Canto of the Divina Commedia, in the third tier, just a step away from the 
                                                 
4 I do not mean to suggest there are literally no attempts to understand any potential relationship Dante had on 
mystics who came after him.  However, there are surprisingly few.  Gian Balsamo has investigated the use of figural 
literalism—that is, the creation of a literary figure who lives the true biography of the author—in both Dante and 
Catherine of Siena.  See Gian Balsamo, Figural Literalism.  Denys Turner has made a case for continuity between 
Dante’s theology and Julian’s.  See Section 4, below, and Denys Turner, Julian of Norwich, Theologian, 106-160.   
5 “The new life begins.” 
6 Vita Nuova, 1. 
7 Hollander, Life in Works, p 16. 
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Virgin Mary herself.8  The scholar Barbara Nolan has suggested that Dante sees in Beatrice the 
presence of Christ, and the same effulgent and divine grace that Christ himself manifests to the 
world, and as such, both the Vita Nuova and the Divina Commedia are a kind of interior 
biography of Dante’s journey towards Christ.9  The words “new life” suggest a change in course 
both decisive and utter, and the higher understanding of which Hollander writes seems to reach 
maturity in the final cantos of Paradiso.  These points—the immanent presence of Christ, an 
interior journey towards salvation, an attempt to reach for a higher understanding—certainly 
sound mystical, but what does (or would) it actually mean to claim that Dante is a mystic? 
 To answer this question, it is necessary to consider what defines a person as a mystic.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I shall define a mystic as someone who: 
1. Has at least one experience outside the ordinary that he or she takes to be spiritual or 
religious in nature, and 
2. Takes the experience(s) named in 1, above, to be of profound enough import to warrant 
organization of all aspects of life, including the interior life, around those experiences.10 
This definition is purposefully broad, as it includes anyone who has experiences of the kind 
implied by the definition.  As such, it avoids construing mysticism as depending on some 
particular course of training or position within a society, while simultaneously including 
individuals who seem to deserve the title of mystic.  The definition includes mystics who have 
appeared out of traditional coenobitic communities, such as was the case with Bernard or 
Richard, both of whom became mystics through practicing prescribed contemplative activities 
within the confines of a cloister.  Such prescribed activities included regular prayer as well as 
                                                 
8 Paradiso, 32:8 
9 Nolan, Book of Revelation, 52. 
10 “Mysticism” is, then, the spiritual or religious practice and thought of mystics. 
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study and contemplation of scripture.  The definition above includes anyone who obtained 
mystical experience via such practices.  Not everyone who engaged in such practices had 
mystical experiences as a result, and therefore it will be useful to distinguish contemplatives 
(those who follow a practice of contemplation and prayer) from mystics (those who fit the above 
definition).  This is particularly important11 because the definition above also includes mystics 
who neither lived an eremitic lifestyle nor who were members of any coenobitic community, 
such as Margaery Kemp (1373~1438) or Jacob Boehme (1575-1624).  It even includes heretical 
mystics such as Marguerite Porette (1250-1310).12  By adverting to mystical experience in this 
definition, I do not mean to suggest that mysticism is all about experience, but rather, that 
experience is necessary to being called a mystic.  Experience, just as such, is not sufficient to 
being called a mystic, however.  It is only when a person values those experiences such that she 
reorganizes her life around them—when, in short, she takes action based on those experiences—
that she is considered a mystic under this definition.  This second condition is needed in 
recognition of the fact that not all religious or spiritual experiences are powerful enough to 
motivate or change the experiencer.  When an experience motivates a mystic to reorganize her 
life, that reorganization is evidence that the experience transformed the experiencer in some 
important way.13   
The above definition is clearly a contemporary one.  There were no accepted definitions 
of mysticism in Dante’s period and for long afterward—indeed, the term “mystic,” applied as a 
                                                 
11 As we shall see below, the distinction between contemplative and mystic is valuable in understanding mystical 
itineraries. 
12 Intuitively, these individuals deserve to be called mystics—that is, there seems to be little disagreement that these 
individuals are, in fact, mystics.  The problem of making a definition is finding a set of conditions that includes all 
the individuals recognized as mystics, without including any who are not mystics.  Any definition that excluded 
someone generally recognized as a mystic would need to justify such exclusion.   
13 William Harmless puts the point in historical context thus: “Mystical views fueled practical drives and reform 
efforts,” Mystics, 227. 
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title, was not used until 1736, some four centuries after the Divina Commedia began to circulate, 
though the term has since become imbedded in scholarly discourse to the point of being 
indispensable.14  It was nevertheless common practice, following Origen (184-253), to write of a 
“mystical sense of scripture,” or, after Dionysius, of “mystical theology.”  This latter term was of 
particular importance from the sixth century, and it continues to maintain its importance in 
current theology.  Roughly, it has two meanings.  First, it means the theology that arises from 
mystical experience.  Second, it also means the theological basis for attaining mystical 
experience.  Thus, a mystic who, in her vision, sees something important about the doctrine of 
the Incarnation and writes about it is doing mystical theology.  Similarly, a mystic who offers 
theory or instruction to others about how to have a mystical experience is also engaged in 
mystical theology. 
Based on these definitions, it might seem that a mystic should be defined as one who 
engages in mystical theology, but not all mystical visions have obvious theological import, when 
the content of those visions is considered entirely on its own.  For example, Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s most famous mystical experience was of receiving a divine milk from a statue of the 
Virgin Mary in a chapel in Chatillon-sur-Seine.15  Considered at it is, this vision (if it was a 
vision) might import a general Mariolatry if, for example, the milk is considered as a blessing or 
a sign of beneficence.  But since the experience included no verbal communication from Mary, 
the rich Mariolatry espoused by Bernard must largely have been derived from other sources.  It is 
therefore important to distinguish theology from mysticism.  Though theologians were often 
mystics, and mystics often contributed to theology, the two subjects are, strictly speaking, 
separate.  Theology requires no particular religious or spiritual experience, while mysticism is 
                                                 
14 Louise Nelstrop, Christian Mysticism, 1-3. 
15 Marina Warner, Alone of All Her Sex, 277. 
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essentially about experience, and as this is so, the definition used herein relies on experience—a 
property particularly germane to Dante’s writings about purported mystical experiences.16 
Dante describes his own final mystical experience in both positive and negative terms.  
The final vision is of a light in which three circles (representing, presumably, the three persons of 
God) appear.17  Yet, Dante insists on the weakness of his own memory in recounting the vision,18 
the inadequacy of language in describing it,19 and, perhaps most importantly, he alludes to the 
fact that the final revelation was not something he, even in his initiated and purified state, could 
attain under his own power.20  Though ineffable and beyond intellectual comprehension, the final 
9*vision was a vision, an experience that engaged multiple sense modalities, including 
apparently interior modalities such as are engaged in imagination or memory.21  Even those 
mystics, such as Johann van Ruysbroeck, who write of the final union with God in the most 
                                                 
16 Contemporary scholarship since at least 1979 has been divided on the subject of the definition of mysticism into 
two broad camps.  One of those is the constructivist camp, which takes the position that mystical experience is 
wholly constructed out of the cultural material in which the mystic is immersed.  In this view, there can be nothing 
in common between the mystical experiences of, say, a sixteenth-century Jewish mystic and a twenty-first century 
Sikh mystic since the cultural materials available to each are entirely different.  Constructivism with regard to 
mystical experience comes in a variety of forms, but scholars and philosophers working within this line of thought 
about mysticism will tend to stress the context within which a mystic is placed as key to understanding her 
mysticism and, especially, any mystical experiences she may have.    For the essay that inaugurated Constructivism, 
see Steven T. Katz, Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism, 22-74, and for discussion of the current trends in 
analysis, see Peter Moore, Mysticism-Further Considerations, 6356-7.  Taking the contrary position is the anti-
constructivist, or unitivist, camp, which adopts the view that while some elements of mysticism can be explained 
through reference to cultural context, there remains a (perhaps ineffable) central reality to mystical experience.  For 
the inaugural anti-constructivist essay, see: Robert C.K. Forman, Constructivism, Mysticism, and Forgetting, 5-49.  
At present, each side touts its own definitions of mysticism, and there is no clearly dominant side.  As such, there is 
no contemporary consensus on the definition of mysticism, and such consensus doesn’t appear to be forthcoming.  I 
have no intention of taking sides in this debate, but have been careful to craft the definition of mysticism used in this 
thesis so that it could be adopted by either camp.  The definition used herein relies not on whether an experience is 
considered veridical, but on how the experiencer takes the experience and what motives arise from it. 
17 Paradiso 33:110-120. 
18 Paradiso 33:106 
19 Paradiso 33:120 
20 Paradiso 33:139 
21 In Paradiso 33:109-113, for example, Dante writes that “he looked” (ch’io mirava), and says of his sight (vista) 




apophatic terms, cannot entirely avoid writing of experience.22  As a supremely gifted writer and 
poet, Dante’s descriptions of apparently mystical experience have few parallels in the entire 
corpus of western literature. 
 Recognition of Dante’s contribution leads to the second of the two questions this thesis is 
meant to address.  What influence might Dante have had on mystics who came after him?  To 
answer this question, as was hinted above, we must first grasp how Dante may have innovated on 
mystical ideas.  Bernard McGinn has recently suggested we should read the Divina Commedia 
not merely as a great Christian epic, but also as a mystical itinerary,23 a term that may be 
unfamiliar to readers who have not spent much time with contemporary literature on Christian 
mysticism.  Mystics have produced a number of means by which to organize their thoughts and 
experiences.  A mystical itinerary organizes mystical experience around the analogy of a 
journey.  Intuitively, the notion that a mystic is on a journey from the ordinary world to direct 
experience of God makes some sense, at least insofar as there must be some kind of change, and 
hence some motion (physical or metaphorical) in something, from world to God.  Mystical 
itineraries typically present descriptions of different states of consciousness and different 
experiences along an ordered vector, such that each successive state of consciousness or 
experience is considered more holy than the previous one.  More simply, a mystical itinerary 
organizes the mystical task as a journey.  While the Divina Commedia is presented as the story of 
                                                 
22 See, for example Johann van Ruysbroeck, Book of Supreme Truth, 12.  Writing of the highest union that is 
“without difference or distinction,” he says “And in consequence of this enlightened men have found within 
themselves an essential contemplation which is above reason and without reason, and a fruitive tendency which 
pierces through every condition and all being, and through which they immerse themselves in a wayless abyss of 
fathomless beatitude...this beatitude is so onefold and so wayless that in it every essential gazing, tendency, and 
creaturely distinction cease and pass away. “  But of the lead-up to this condition, he writes in chapter 9 of the same 
work: “…man through his bodily feeling may sometimes pass into a ghostly feeling which is according to reason; 
and through this ghostly feeling, he may pass into a godly feeling, which is above reason; and, through this godly 
feeling, he may drown himself in an unchangeable and beatific feeling.”  Johann writes in undeniably apophatic 
terms, but nevertheless affirms that mysticism has an essential experiential component. 
23 Bernard McGinn, Flowering, 180. 
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a journey, it cannot have been a journey undertaken in the actual world.  Rather, it must be 
understood as an allegory of an interior journey, one that starts in a dark wood, symbolizing the 
state of being mired in sin, and ends in the supreme vision and direct experience of God.  Along 
the way, the pilgrim is emphatically cast as a learner, whose understanding of topics necessary to 
obtaining the final vision changes as the journey progresses.  Dante, for his part, claims that his 
masterwork will lead a reader into a deeper relationship with God.24  As such, he clearly intends 
his poem to function as a mystical itinerary, albeit one that deviates substantially from the norm. 
 A standard mystical itinerary, or at least a broad overview of a standard itinerary, had 
developed in the Medieval Latin West by the 11th century.  That itinerary had its roots in the far 
older devotional practices of the Desert Fathers25—notably Anthony of Alexandria (251-356), 
and Origen’s commentary on the Solomonic books.  It was promulgated to the Latin West via the 
writings of Ambrose of Milan.26  The standard itinerary featured three stages: purgation, 
illumination, and union with God (purgatio, illuminatio, unio).27  In the first stage, the 
contemplative is purged of sin or other obstacles that might prevent her from passing on to the 
next stage.  In the second stage, the contemplative gains a deeper understanding of God, of 
Christ, of sainthood, and of scripture.  The final stage is the goal of contemplative pursuits, 
though it is typically understood to encompass more than one degree of depth of 
contemplation—such that one vision or experience of union is more pure than another. 
                                                 
24 Dante, Letter to Can Grande, 199; see also Paradiso 1:70-2. 
25 The “Desert Fathers” is a collective name applied to some members of groups living in monastic conditions in the 
early centuries of Christianity in the deserts of Egypt.  Aside from Anthony the Great and Pachomius the Great 
(292-248), very little is known about most of the individuals comprising these early Christian monastics, other than 
what is collected in The Sayings of the Fathers, which is, as the title suggests, a collection of sayings of these early 
Christian monastics.  See Benedicta Ward, ed., trans., Foreword to Sayings of the Desert Fathers, xvii-xxxi. 
26 McGinn, Foundations, 197-9.  
27 For discussion of the standard itinerary and the role it played in mystical practice before the fourteenth century, 
see: McGinn, Growth, 144-5, 183. 
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 This standard itinerary was a framework for actual itineraries produced by medieval 
mystics, notably John Climacus (d. 606), Bernard, and Bonaventure (1221-1274).28  These 
authors, as we will see, mold their itineraries on the standard one, but each also elaborates that 
itinerary, presumably according to their individual experiences.  Each author brings unique 
insight to the process of attaining mystical experience—that is, of the journey from life as a 
contemplative to becoming a mystic, as well as a unique storehouse of analogies and metaphors 
by which to conceive and describe spiritual progress, and so the itineraries produced by each 
author differ in their details.  Nevertheless, mystical itineraries prior to Dante followed this 
standard model.  If we take seriously McGinn’s suggestion that the Divina Commedia should be 
read as a mystical itinerary, then it becomes clear it does not follow the standard itinerary.29 
                                                 
28 Notably, the only female mystic to have produced an itinerary explicitly as an itinerary in the Medieval period 
was Marguerite Porete (1250-1310), and she was declared a heretic and burned at the stake shortly after circulation 
of her work, The Mirror of Simple Souls.  The third part of Hildegard of Bingen’s (1098-1179) Scivias, written in 
1142, and Angela of Foligno’s (1238-1409) Memoriale, circulated in 1300, are perhaps the works closest to 
itineraries by female mystics who avoided execution.  But the Scivias is presented as an ordered series of 
Hildegaard’s visions from the third part of which an itinerary might be deduced, though Hildegaard herself refrained 
from so doing.  Similarly, the Memoriale is presented as a simple record of Angela’s spiritual progress and is 
bundled together with instructions for mystical progress, though these are not placed in any particular order.  
Importantly, Angela makes no claim that her journey might be instructive for other contemplatives.  As we will see 
below, Teresa of Avila succeeded in producing an itinerary while remaining in the good graces of the Church. 
29 One simple and obvious way it deviates from the standard itinerary is that it is presented as a narrative, rather than 
as a set of ordered instructions to a contemplative, as was the common form of itineraries both before and after 
circulation of the Divina Commedia.  The imagery of the poem is one of its most outstanding features, and imagery 
had come to play an increasingly important role in contemplative practice since the twelfth century, when female 
mystics, especially Hildegaard of Bingen, Elizabeth of Schonau (1129-1164), and Christina Mirabilis (1150-1224), 
began to blur established lines separating categories of vision in Medieval theology.  This development led, in turn, 
to an increasing emphasis on imaginal forms of devotion such as meditation on the image of the crucifix, or 
reconstruction in imagination of various episodes of the life of Christ, in which the affective faculties could be 
engaged.  If Dante were purely a mystic, or a mystic first, it would be possible to view the fact that his itinerary is 
presented as an epic poem as part of this broad evolution in contemplative practice—and indeed, it is entirely 
possible that his poem was influenced by just this growing reliance on imaginal forms of devotion.  But this change 
in contemplative practice also provides a doorway through which the Divina Commedia could come to be seen as an 
exposition of a mystical itinerary, and as the writing of a mystic, could participate in the confluence of mystical 
literature from the fourteenth century onward.  Since it was already the case that contemplative practice was turning 
towards the use of imagination and narrative, a narrative of the soul’s journey through the entire spiritual realm was 
both timely and desirable.  Dante’s supreme skill as poet and maker of images provided ample material for mystical 
contemplation, and it is this fact coupled with the growth of imaginal forms of devotion that would have piqued the 
interest of mystics.  Still, this change in devotional practice was underway nearly two centuries prior to Dante’s life.  
See: McGinn, Flowering, 155; see also Nelstrop, Christian Mysticism, 183-7. 
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Dante’s epic is divided into three cantiche—Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso.  The 
first, Inferno, is divided into thirty-four cantos, while Purgatorio and Paradiso are divided into 
thirty-three cantos each.  As a mystical itinerary, however, the poem is a narrative of a change in 
the pilgrim.  Each time the pilgrim reorients himself within the poem towards some more holy 
goal is a liminal event, a passage from one episode in the mystical itinerary to the next.  As such, 
we can recognize six broad episodes: being lost in the dark wood, the journey through Hell, the 
climbing of Purgatory, a period of repose in the Earthly Paradise, the journey through the sub-
solar circles of Heaven, and the journey to the final vision through the inner circles of Heaven.  
Recall that the standard itinerary consisted of three episodes: purgation, illumination, and union.  
Comparing these three standard episodes to the structure of Dante’s epic reveals that the Divina 
Commedia departed substantively from the standard itinerary. 
As we will see below, mystical itineraries prior to circulation of the Divina Commedia 
either did not substantively address the question of sin, or alternately, advised the contemplative 
to avoid thinking about sin.  The pilgrim’s journey through hell would have been unnecessary, 
and even anathema, in the views of the mystics who came before Dante.  Nevertheless, for 
Dante, a tour through all the sins committed by human beings is a necessary step along the 
mystical path.30  Mystics after Dante began to take up the idea that examination of sin could be a 
source of wisdom for the contemplative, and was necessary so as to avoid potential wrong 
turnings along the mystical itinerary.  As we shall see in a later section of this thesis, itineraries 
before the circulation of the Divina Commedia either avoided mention of sin, or actively warned 
against any examination of sin by contemplatives.  Dante’s interpolation of Inferno on the 
mystical itinerary has no counterpart in the history of mystical itineraries prior to the fourteenth 
                                                 
30 Inferno 1:95-6. 
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century.  Dante, through the Divina Commedia, was responsible for introducing some profound 
innovations on both the understanding of the role of desire on the mystical path, and on the 
standard mystical itinerary, according to which separation of purgation and illumination is 
mistaken.  As such, these parts of the standard itinerary are no longer distinct episodes in Dante’s 
itinerary, which has a wholly different principle of organization than had previous itineraries; the 
Divina Commedia, as mystical itinerary, is organized around the transformation of desire or 
human love into divine love.  In summary, then, I will argue that Dante made three important 
contributions to mystical thought: 
1. The notion that examination of sin can be a source of wisdom for the mystic. 
2. Desire as both the source of sin and also the engine of progress on the mystical path. 
3. Interpolation of Inferno as a necessary episode on the mystical itinerary. 
In reevaluating the role of desire on the mystical path and reorganizing the mystical 
itinerary, Dante influenced mystics who came after him—and the analysis of that reorganization 
provides part of the answer to a heretofore neglected aspect of the question of Dante’s 
relationship to mysticism.  Later in this thesis, I shall present evidence from the writings of four 
mystics—Johann van Ruysbroeck (1294-1381), Julian of Norwich (1342-1416), Ignatius of 
Loyola (1491-1556), and Teresa of Avila (1515-1582)—to show that Dante’s idea about the 
importance of an examination of sin caught on.  With the present thesis, at least some work will 
have been done toward showing Dante’s influence on mystics who came after him.  To fully 
grasp the nature of his contribution, however, we must first grapple with the nature of Dante’s 
own mysticism.  As I shall argue in the next section, Dante was both a poet and a mystic, and 





Section II: Dante's Mysticism 
 Dante clearly knew about, and had read, a great many mystics, and it is certainly possible 
to believe that he had digested and reformed that material in the forge of his own considerable 
genius.  I contend, however, that Dante was a mystic, per the definition in the previous section.31  
Dante seems to allude to his own regular devotional practice in Paradiso 23:88-9, which may 
form a basis of training through which he was able to attain mystical experience.  However, 
Dante also describes spontaneous visions in the Vita Nuova, and in a letter to Moroello 
Malaspina, to be examined below.32 
We are fortunate to have some of Dante’s correspondence.  In two surviving letters, both 
to be examined below, Dante either describes apparent mystical experience or comments on his 
poetic descriptions of such experiences in the Divina Commedia.  These letters are of particular 
import as they occur outside the context of narrative.  The episodes in the Divina Commedia are 
part of a tale that is a literal fiction (that is, the events of the narrative did not happen in the 
actual world), and as such, we might suspect those episodes of being mere poetic contrivance. 
However, when Dante comments on experiences in his correspondence, he is not writing in the 
context of telling a story, but either commenting on the Divina Commedia, or alternately, 
describing his experiences.  In his letter to Can Grande, Dante describes the final vision thus: 
                                                 
31 There have been some critics who have questioned the veracity of the notion that human beings even have 
mystical experiences, or at least that mystical experiences are anything other than fantasies constructed from cultural 
material.  See, for example, Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 228-36.  More recent work on the psychology 
and neuroscience of mystical experience has, however, strongly indicated that mystical experiences are real and that 
they do not belong to some other category of experience—they are not dreams, epileptic episodes, the result of 
schizophrenia, or mere hallucinations.  See Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newburg, Mystical Mind, 109-120.  I am 
going to assume that human beings have mystical experiences, and that at least in principle, it is possible for anyone 
to have them. 
32 One category of mystic currently acknowledged, but not well-studied, by contemporary psychology is the natural 
mystic—a person to whom mystical experiences simply occur, without any special preparation or exercise 
necessary.  See Paul Marshall, Encounters, 21-48. 
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He proceedeth to speak of Paradise, by circumlocution, and saith that he was 
within that heaven which receiveth most of the glory of God, or of his light.  And 
from this it is to be understood that that is the highest heaven, containing all 
bodies and contained by none, within which all bodies move, whilst it remainenth 
in sempiternal quiet and receiveth its virtue from no corporeal substance.33 
 
Since Dante’s letters were presumably not a fiction, but an expression of his actual thoughts and 
feelings, it is useful to compare these words to the corresponding lines in Paradiso. 
Bernard was signaling—he smiled—to me/ to turn my eyes on high; but I, 
already/ was doing what he wanted me to do,/ because my sight, becoming pure, 
was able/ to penetrate the ray of Light more deeply—/ that Light, sublime, which 
in Itself is true.34 
 
The imagery of divine light, and God as Light, appeared previously in the canto, but only in the 
prayer of Bernard, though Dante invoked this imagery previously throughout Paradiso.  The 
poem continues with an address to the reader: 
From that point on, what I could see was greater/ than speech can show; at such a 
sight, it fails,/ and memory fails when faced with such excess./  As one who sees 
within a dream, and, later, the passion that had been imprinted stays, but nothing 
of the rest returns to mind,/ such am I, for my vision almost fades/ completely, yet 
it still distills within/ my heart the sweetness that was born of it.35 
 
In the letter to Can Grande, Dante expresses the same thought in these words: 
For the comprehension of these things it must be understood, that when the 
human intellect is exalted in this life, on account of the natural relation and 
affinity that it hath to the separate intellectual substance, it is exalted to such a 
degree that after return the memory waxeth feeble, because it hath transcended 
human bounds.36 
 
These comparisons suggest that Dante wrote about his actual experiences in his poetry.  Dante 
goes on, in the letter to Can Grande, to cite Bernard and Richard of St. Victor as authorities to 
show that visions that transcend the ability of the mind to fully apprehend or recall are possible.37  
                                                 
33 Letter to Can Grande, 207. 
34 Paradiso 30: 49-54. 
35 Paradiso 30: 55-63. 
36 Letter to Can Grande, 211-12. 
37 Letter to Can Grande, 213-4. 
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His citation of Bernard and Richard was probably meant to show that then-contemporary people 
could have such experiences as Paul had. 
Dante’s citations of Richard and Bernard nevertheless hold some surprises.  The words of 
Richard of St. Victor to which Dante likely refers are these: “For some things are such, which go 
beyond the understanding of the human, and the human cannot investigate by reason.”38  Richard 
goes on to write that even of rarified visions, the mystic retains “a kind of memory.”39  His own 
words stop short of, and perhaps directly contradict, Dante’s claim that certain experiences might 
themselves be beyond the ability of a human being to recall; Richard’s claim is that certain 
subjects are beyond the understanding of reason.40  Similarly, the most likely words of Bernard’s 
to which Dante refers are these:  
But he is the greatest of all who, scorning the use of sensible things as far as 
human frailty permits, has accustomed himself, not by gradual steps, but by 
sudden ecstatic flights to soar aloft to the glorious things on high.  I suppose 
Paul’s ecstasies were of this last description; they were departures rather than 
ascents, for he himself relates that he did not ascend into paradise, but was caught 
up thither.41 
 
Bernard does not claim that ecstatic experiences, even those of the apostle Paul, are beyond the 
ability of human memory to recall, merely that they are departures (perhaps from sensible 
things).  Nothing in the work of either author, especially in the places Dante cites, is a remark on 
                                                 
38 Richard of St. Victor, The Mystical Ark, 278. 
39 Ibid., 278. 
40 Perhaps it is possible to infer from Richard’s claim that certain experiences are beyond the abilities of human 
memory, but this would require three auxiliary assumptions: First, that those subjects that are beyond human reason 
correlate to their own peculiar set of experiences, second, that those experiences are also beyond human memory, 
and third, that it is possible for a human being to have at least some of those experiences, even if they are in some 
way beyond recall.  But the second and third auxiliary assumptions are essentially what Dante claims, and ergo, he 
didn’t get his view about the difficulty of recalling mystical experience from Richard.  The question at hand is about 
the relationship of reason to experience.  Some readers will likely be convinced that an experience that is utterly 
beyond the ken of reason is as impossible as a triangle without line segments or language without syntax.  Steven 
Katz seems close to this view in his essay Language, Mysticism, and Epistemology.  In this view, reason is a 
necessary constituent of experience, and so no experience can transcend reason.  Dante is making the claim that 
experience beyond the ability of reason to comprehend is, in fact, possible, and he asserts his own experience as 
evidence for his case. 
41 Bernard of Clairvaux, Consideration, 172. 
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experience that cannot be recalled later—at least not without added assumptions.  Dante himself 
offers us the assumption he adds to these and other scriptural sources he cites.  It is precisely 
because, writes Dante, the mind has “exceeded human bounds,” that the memory is unable to 
recall much of the experiences it has.42  This notion of exceeding human bounds is one to which 
we shall return.  For now, Dante seems to be arguing that, to the extent that the memory of a 
human being is a human faculty, transcending human bounds takes one outside the grasp of 
human faculties.  But he is not merely arguing in the abstract, he is arguing that among his own 
experiences are to be found some that exceed human bounds. 
 Another example exists, and one that strikes me as even better evidence that Dante was 
not only a mystic, but that he incorporated his mystical experience into his poetry.  In a passage 
in Dante’s letter to Moroello Malaspina includes an apparent description of a mystical vision: 
I set foot by the streams of Arno...when suddenly alas! descending like a flash of 
lightning, there appeared to me, I know not how, a woman suited in all respects to 
my inclinations, my character, and my fortunes.  Oh! how in wonder at her did I 
stand amazed.  But my amazement gave place to the terror of the thunder that 
followed.  For just as the lightnings from heaven are followed straightway by 
thunder, so I had barely beheld the flash of her beauty, when a love, terrible and 
imperious, held sway over me.  And this love, as violent as a lord who, banished 
from his native land, returns to it after a long exile, either slew, or drove forth, or 
fettered whatever had been contrary to him within me...The assiduous meditations 
wherewith I was contemplating the things of heaven and earth...he impiously 
banished.  Finally, lest my soul should yet longer rebel against him, he fettered 
my free will, so that I must need turn, not where I wish, but where he wishes.43 
 
Here, Dante claims to have had a vision of a divine woman, and divine or saintly women are a 
staple of Dante’s mystical imagery.  One of the few seemingly autobiographical references to 
Dante’s own spirituality is an indication that he invokes the Virgin Mary, “that fair flower,” 
morning and evening,44 and this vision reads like an answer to his invocation.  Ralph McInerny 
                                                 
42 Letter to Can Grande, 212. 
43 Letter to Malaspina, 55-6. 
44 Paradiso 23: 88-9. 
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has even suggested that Paradiso is a “cumulative concentration” on the Virgin,45 and this vision 
seems to indicate that Dante’s Mariolatry was for him a reality, and not constructed as part of a 
poetic persona for the Pilgrim.  This description of a vision on the banks of the Arno occurs in 
context alongside one of Dante’s poems (a canzone that was not part of any longer work), which 
seems to be motivated by the vision itself—a relationship between vision and verse similar to 
that alleged to exist in the letter to Can Grande, wherein Dante claims that Paradiso was written 
on the basis of personal experience.   
The canzone was offered to Malaspina as a means to explain the effect the vision had on 
him.  The poet is now ruled by a violent and powerful love.  Echoes of the transformation 
announced at the beginning of the Vita Nuova are apparent, which can be read as a description of 
the transmogrification of Dante’s soul, while he was yet alive, into the new life as the poet (and 
perhaps even prophet) of love.  But the story told in the Vita Nuova of that transformation does 
not include this vision, and it is unclear when the letter to Malaspina was written.46  As Dante 
presents this vision, it simply came to him, without him having prayed or engaged in ascetic 
practice to obtain it.  The description makes clear that the vision was affective and consequential 
for Dante.  The vision transformed him in an instant. 
If we take Dante at his word in this description of the vision on the banks of the Arno, 
Dante qualifies as a mystic under the definition proposed in the previous section.  Dante writes 
that the vision came like a lightning flash from heaven, and was followed by a thunderous 
outbreak of love within him, suggesting that he takes the vision to be spiritual in nature.  The 
                                                 
45 Ralph McInerny, Blessed Virgin, 103. 
46 Dante claims that it occurred by the banks of the streams of the Arno, suggesting the vision itself happened before 
Dante’s permanent exile from Florence.  A member of the Malaspina family, Currado, is mentioned in Purgatorio 
8:117-126, suggesting that perhaps this letter was composed after Dante’s exile, in the temporal neighborhood of the 
composition of Purgatorio. 
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transformation he records fits the second criterion, in that Dante’s life is reorganized around the 
vision itself.  This vision is, then, enough to qualify Dante as a mystic.  However, to appreciate 
the nature of Dante’s mysticism, and the innovations he made on the mystical itinerary, it will be 
necessary to go beyond these visions to examine Dante’s published writings.  The Vita Nuova 
chronicles Dante’s relationship with Beatrice and expresses, in poetic terms, the visions and 
inner experiences through which Dante becomes a devotee of Amor, the god of love.  In an essay 
published along with his translation of the Vita Nuova, Mark Musa argues that Dante grapples 
with the cross-currents of two kinds of love or desire, which Musa describes as the lower and 
higher aspects of love.47  When the Vita Nuova begins, Dante is selfish, concerned only with the 
lesser aspects of love.  In Musa’s view, Dante is constantly concerned with Beatrice’s effect on 
him, and he could be said to want to possess her on the one hand, and yet he is afraid to converse 
with her.48  After Beatrice’s death, Dante must confront the fact that he has not understood love, 
and that his love for Beatrice includes the higher aspects of love, a divine love that goes far 
beyond the bounds of normal human love.  Beatrice becomes a symbol for Dante’s desire, and as 
she is transformed from a living woman to a saint in heaven, so Dante’s desire (his love) is 
transformed. 
Along lines similar to Musa’s analysis, Carin McClain has more recently focused on the 
implausibility of the story of the screen woman that occupies a part of the Vita Nuova.  Dante 
would have us believe that he attempts to hide his love for Beatrice through the use of a “screen 
woman,” that is, a woman whom he does not love, but about whom he can dissemble so as to 
                                                 
47 Mark Musa, An Essay on the Vita Nuova, 111. 
48 Ibid., 109-12. 
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make others think his affection is directed to her.49  McClain argues that Dante has used the 
screen woman as a metaphor for  
a kind of desire—a convention, courtly desire—that is fungible and can be 
transferred from one beloved to another based on her interest and availability.  
Love for Beatrice, however, is non-transferable: because she herself is 
extraordinary...the kind of love she inspires, as the protagonist will eventually 
discover, is utterly unique.50   
 
The final vision of Beatrice that confronts Dante after her death is not explicitly 
mystical—it is easy to read it as simply an instance of a clear memory arising from grief—but its 
very presence provides the conceptual foundation, in the form of a pure and innocent love, for 
the most mystical experiences Dante records.  The other visions discussed above are not so easy 
to dismiss as mere memory, and they have effected a change in Dante, from the self-absorbed 
youth of the first half of the Vita Nuova, to the more mature poet who is a servant of the higher 
aspects of love.  Transformation of the entire human being, and the process of transformation, 
has in the meantime become one of the central themes of the Vita Nuova, and as we shall 
presently see, of the Divina Commedia.  In the words of Barbara Nolan, “The history of the 
lover's relationship with Beatrice is also the record of his progress towards salvation.”51   The 
Vita Nuova is sometimes thought of as a kind of unintentional introduction to the Divina 
Commedia, especially insofar as Beatrice is one of the central characters of the Divina 
Commedia.52  Where the Vita Nuova leaves off, with Dante vowing to “write of her that which 
has never been written of any other woman,”53 the Divina Commedia picks up.  The appearance 
of Beatrice in the final cantos of Purgatorio, and through to canto 31 of Paradiso, fulfills 
                                                 
49 Vita Nuova 8-9. 
50 Carin McLain, Screening the Past, 2. 
51 Nolan, Revelation, 52. 
52 Ibid., 51. 
53 Vita Nuova, 86. 
20 
 
Dante’s vow.  And with her resurrection in the Divina Commedia, Dante has found it necessary 
also to resurrect precisely that which he seems to have buried in the final image of Beatrice in the 
Vita Nuova—desire, for (especially in Purgatorio) it is desire for Beatrice that spurs the Pilgrim 
to move onward.54 
 One pathway toward understanding the role of desire in Dante’s mysticism may be found 
in understanding the nature of desire within the larger traditions of Christian mysticism.  Popular 
notions of the strict chastity prescribed by the Church might suggest that erotic imagery and 
desire could never enter into mystical contemplation.  In fact, this is not the case.  Mechthild of 
Magdeburg (1207-1294) had, for example, conceived of the soul’s relationship with God as a 
mutual love, in which God commands the mystic to lay in “utter repose and nakedness” before 
Him.55  Lino Pertile suggests that Dante understood the bliss of union with God not as a static 
and timeless point, but as an ever-evolving process, the motile force for which is love, in all its 
many aspects, high and low.56  Upon entering heaven, the blessed pilgrim is not confronted with 
figures who are content to remain where they are, but rather, who are content with their ever-
burning desire for God.57  Pertile writes “The hope and purpose of the pilgrim in his ascent to the 
Empyrean will not be the extinction of desire, but its constant fulfilment, the attainment of a 
perfect state of equilibrium whereby his soul will always receive what it desires and will never 
cease desiring what it receives.”58  The language of love in desire had long been a feature of 
Christian mystical writings.  John Climacus writes of love as “an abyss of light, a fountain of 
fire.  The more it flows the more burning the thirst for it becomes.”59  Augustin does not shy 
                                                 
54 See, for example, Purgatorio 6:43-51, 15: 76-82, 27: 34-54. 
55 Mechtilde of Magdeburg, The Flowing Light of Godhead, 205. 
56 Lino Pertile, Desire of Paradise, 151-2. 
57 See, for example, Paradiso 3:57,  
58 Pertile, Desire of Paradise, 154. 
59 John Climacus, Ladder of Divine Ascent, 291. 
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away from using the metaphor of a sexual encounter to describe mystical union.60  Bernard, in 
commenting on the Song of Songs, advises his audience to, without qualification, love 
passionately, for only by doing so can they understand the language of scripture.61  But in these 
and similar cases, the erotic desire for sensual contact with another human being is transformed 
into a metaphor for desire for union with God.  Such metaphors are not to be understood as a 
direction to contemplatives to engage in anything sensual.  Bernard, again, makes this clear when 
he remarks that the Song of Songs can be read as the poetry of a human marriage, but such is not 
its ultimate depth.62  Commenting on the evidence we have for Dante’s own sexual character, 
one contemporary biographer notes 
Boccaccio regretted that he had to record Dante’s inclination through his life to 
the sin of lussuria, or lechery; yet what this probably means is simply that Dante 
had a strong sexual drive.  Indeed, it was the tension between his sexuality and his 
aspiration towards a perfect, rational, and intellectual love that helps to explain 
the variety, intensity, and amplitude of his creative powers…His falling in love 
when he was almost nine with the child Beatrice was a mystical experience of 
enhanced consciousness that transformed, refined, and purified the later and more 
self-acknowledged sexual attraction and the overwhelming emotions to which he 
gave vent in his verse.63 
 
If there is any truth to this speculation, then few strains of thought in the writings of mysticism 
could have been more congenial to Dante’s character than those concerned with desire.  This use 
of desire in the history of mystical thought is, for Pertile, one of the underlying pillars of the 
Divina Commedia.  He notes that Dante may have adopted this language of desire to help “spin 
out” the tale of travelling through paradise; were heaven one single timeless moment of 
unchanging bliss, there would be no story to tell.64  I prefer to think that Dante poured too much 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., Augustin, Exposition of Psalm 139, pp 162-7. 
61 Bernard, Sermons 3, 53. 
62 Ibid., 54. 
63 Anderson, Maker, 401. 
64 Pertile, Desire, 150. 
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emotion into the erotic aspects of his poetry, and into the transformation of the pilgrim in the 
Divina Commedia, for the theme to have been a mere structural or stylistic choice. 
Whether or not the language of desire in mystical thought helped Dante tell the story he 
wished to tell, there can be little denying that, for Dante, desire plays a crucial role in the Divina 
Commedia, as if it had been resurrected from its burial in the Vita Nuova.  If there is a distinction 
between love and desire in the Divina Commedia, it is difficult to find.  Love is conceived as a 
motive force, one that moves or impels one to seek the object of desire.65  When confronting the 
wall of fire of Purgatorio 27, Dante the pilgrim hesitates, feeling its heat.  Virgil says to him 
“Now see, son: this wall stands between you and your Beatrice.”66  Upon hearing the name that 
was “always flowering” within his mind,67 Dante braves the flames.68  Later, Beatrice guides 
Dante through Paradise, a theme itself redolent with erotic overtones.  And yet, Beatrice is a 
saint, ensconced in the rose of the highest heaven.  As Barabara Seward has observed, “In his 
supreme apotheosis of Beatrice, Dante has succeeded in reconciling two great discordant forces 
of the medieval spirit, human and divine love.”69  Dante’s love for Beatrice is ultimately the 
alchemical alembic in which he is able to achieve his mystical vision. The (almost) unerring 
constancy of his love for her is a mirror of the love for God that will lead a human being into 
direct experience with God.  It is his longing for her that impels him to take the final steps 
through the fire and into paradise.   
In an investigation of the sources of Dante’s poetry, Mark Mirsky examines the 
connections between the transformation of desire in the Divina Commedia, and the mysticism of 
                                                 
65 The final line of Paradiso, and thus of the whole epic, is “the Love that moves the sun and the other stars.” 
66 Purgatorio 27: 35-6. 
67 Purgatorio 27: 41 
68 Purgatorio 27: 49-51. 
69 Barbara Seward, Mystic Rose, 518. 
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Kabbalah.  He makes two observations that are of note.  First, he points out the similarities in the 
overall form of the Divina Commedia to the Merkabah mysticism that serves as the foundation 
for Kabbalah.70  The Merkabah mystic descends to the throne of God, all the while describing the 
process of doing so as an ascent.  The paradoxical character of this claim is taken to imply a 
descent through the more infernal aspects of Ezekiel’s visions, such as the valley of dry bones in 
Ezekiel 37: 1-14.  It is only by passing through such terrifying realms that the mystic can come 
to behold the vision that so drove King David: the vision of God enthroned.  Like King David’s 
legendary lust for Bathsheba,71 the theme of sexual desire runs like blood throughout the main 
texts of the Kabbalah.  Just as Beatrice, and the Virgin Mary beyond her, serves as an image of 
holiness, Mirsky points out that, in Kabbalistic doctrine, it is through the divine feminine, the 
Shekinah, that the mystic achieves union with God.72  This union is explicitly erotic, though it is 
an Eros that makes use of sexual lust, but is transformed into a kind of holy lust, an undying lust 
for the indwelling of the divine spirit.73 
The rather more openly sexual character of Kabbalistic mysticism, if it is one of Dante’s 
sources, may help to explain the origin of his innovations on the standard mystical itinerary.74  
By providing a more positive vision of the nature of desire, Kabbalah may have served to 
underwrite Dante’s view of desire and hence of sin.  As we will see later, Dante’s view of sin 
and evil differed substantially from that of earlier theologians and mystics.  For now, it is 
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73 Ibid., 8-9. 
74 The emphasis on sexuality also created a problem for Dante, as it had to a lesser degree for earlier mystics.  Put 
simply, original sin was conceived as being literally transmitted to each child through the act of sexual intercourse 
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necessary to understand Dante’s theory of sin as explained in the Divina Commedia, as his 
theory is what entails the necessity of placing an investigation of sin on his mystical itinerary. 
Dante propounds a general theory of sin, the main exposition of which is to be found in 
canto eleven of Inferno and seventeen of Purgatorio.  In the first, Virgil explains that Hell is 
divided broadly into three sets of rings, in which are punished, from top to bottom and in 
increasing order of severity, sins of incontinence, sins of malice, and sins of fraud.75  Sins of 
incontinence are punished with less severity than are sins of malice, and fraud, being peculiar to 
human beings, is punished more harshly than all other sins.76  Building on this foundation in 
canto seventeen of Purgatorio, Virgil completes the general theory of sin of the Divina 
Commedia.  In this speech, Virgil says first that “there’s no Creator and no creature who ever 
was without love—natural or mental.”77  Natural love is always without error, but mental love—
that is, the love and desire of a minded object, such as a human being—can fall into error, 
choosing an evil object, or by being either too vigorous, or not vigorous enough.78  Love directed 
to the First Good—God, the Prime Mover—and only to other goods in due measure, remains 
good.79  But when the mind directs the good towards some evil, the love causes sin.80  Virgil 
goes on to describe two kinds of love that are corrected in Purgatory.  The first is the love that 
corresponds (mostly) to the sins of violence in Inferno, and these are purged with terrible 
punishments on the lower steps of purgatory. The second is less severe, and corresponds to the 
sins of incontinence.81 
                                                 
75 Inferno 11: 22-30, 84. 
76 Inferno 11: 25. 
77 Purgatorio 17: 91-2. 
78 Purgatorio 17: 94-6. 
79 Purgatorio 17: 97-9. 
80 Purgatorio 17: 100-3. 
81 It is perhaps notable that the fraudulent do not have their own distinct terraces on the mountain of purgatory.  The 
sins of fraud are, of course, the worst of the worst in the scheme presented in Inferno, and it is possible Dante 
25 
 
The mental love that can be perverted, in Dante’s view, cannot be the love possessed by 
just any minded being.  Otherwise, God, as a minded being, would be possibly capable of sin—
and this is not an acceptable outcome.  When Dante has Virgil say that neither creature nor 
Creator is born without love, we should probably not understand him as making the claim that 
the love of the Creator, and of His creatures, possesses all the same properties.  The love of the 
Creator cannot be perverted, only the love of His creatures, particularly human beings, can.  If 
this is right, talk of human love as distinct from divine love is warranted in at least some sense.  
Augustin writes that human beings learn love from God, who loved us first.82  Bernard puts the 
same thought this way: “He (God) has put love in order in me.”83  God has, in these strains of 
theology and mysticism, given human beings love directly, and the love human beings have for 
one another is the selfsame love that God has for creatures.  Divine love and human love 
therefore share a substantial identity, but differ in their modal properties: it is possible for human 
love to be perverted, while impossible for divine love to be perverted.  On the account Virgil 
gives, in cases where human love actually does become perverted, it leads inevitably to sin.  The 
danger that desire presents is precisely that it can lead to sin.  But human beings come with 
desire seemingly inborn, and if it cannot be excised, it must be transformed.   Of the many 
seeming ways into the highest heaven, this one is the way Dante has chosen: the transformation 
of desire so that it no longer serves the lesser, human aspects of love, but the greater, divine 
aspects.  On this particular path, desire is not a disturbance, but an absolute necessity—it is the 
engine by which the contemplative makes any progress at all.  Through this doorway, and 
perhaps only through this doorway, Dante seems to say, can we attain union with God while 
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living.  The language of necessity pervades the Divina Commedia; Virgil reminds the pilgrim 
again and again that God himself has ordained this journey,84 and given that 1) Dante seems to 
suggest that everyone can make the journey his pilgrim makes and 2) that desire or human love 
transformed is the principle story of that journey, the transformation of desire or human love is 
the truly essential mystical goal.  Realizing this point has far reaching consequences for the 
enterprise of Christian mysticism, as we shall shortly see. 
The vision of the final canto of Paradiso is presented as the supreme vision of which not 
only Dante the pilgrim is capable, but of which any mortal person is capable.85  Dante describes 
parts of the vision with characteristic skill, but at the same time, laments that “what I could see 
was greater than speech could show.”  The mystical knowledge that comes to him via this vision 
does not come via the usual means by which vision conveys knowledge.  Dante writes of his 
experience as akin to a dream in a certain respect: 
As one who sees within a dream, and, later,/ the passion that had been imprinted 
stays,/ but nothing of the rest returned to mind,/ such am I, for my vision almost 
fades/ completely, yet it still distills within/ my heart the sweetness that was born 
of it./ So is the snow, beneath the sun, unsealed;/ and so, on the light leaves, 
beneath the wind,/ the oracles the Sibyl wrote were lost.86 
 
The “sweetness” of the vision remained with Dante, but the images are difficult to recall.  
Difficult, but not impossible, as Dante goes on to record some imagery in the remaining lines of 
the canto.  He sees first an “Eternal Light,”87 within which he sees, bound “by love into one 
single volume”88 things that normally seem separate to us.  Within this light, as his sight grows 
stronger, he perceives three circles of different colors but equal dimension.89  One, presumably 
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the Son, is reflected from another, presumably the father,90 and from both comes a fire to create a 
third circle, which can be none other than the Holy Spirit.91  Within this vision of the Christian 
trinity, Dante perceived “our effigy”92—that is, he saw the human form within the circles 
representing God.  The final few lines are worth quoting in full for the illumination they shed on 
this vision: 
As the geometer intently seeks/ to square the circle, but he cannot reach,/ through 
thought on thought, the principle he needs,/ so I searched that strange sight; I 
wished to see/ the way in which our human effigy/ suited the circle and found 
place in it—/ and my own thoughts were far too weak for that./ But then my mind 
was struck by light that flashed/ and, with this light, received what it had asked./ 
Here force failed my high fantasy; but my desire and will were moved already—
like/ a wheel revolving uniformly—by/ the Love that moves the sun and the other 
stars.93 
 
Mandelbaum glosses the phrase “what it had asked” as the mystery of Christ.94  However, Dante 
also sees within the circles painted “our effigy” (la nostra effige)—that is, our own human form, 
and seeks the answer to how that form can dwell within those circles.  Christ was, in the 
mythology to which Dante subscribes, incarnate as a human being, but this is, in the history of 
mystical thought both before and after Dante, only one of the ways in which God and human 
beings come into direct contact.  The way most relevant in this moment at the height of heaven is 
mystical union with God, and though the incarnation is what makes such union possible, 
instances of mystics attaining union with God were considered genuine, and Dante certainly 
takes his own experience as such.  But the apparent fact that human beings can attain union with 
God remains a mystery to be unraveled only through the experience of union.  In the final 
moments of Dante’s journey, it is the human image raised up to the divine trinity, the mystery of 
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divine union that Dante, after all the purification through which he has gone, still wishes to 
understand.   
The desire to understand the way in which the human image fits into the most essential 
vision of God is the final desire presented in the entire poem.  The pilgrim has desired to 
question the events and spirits to which he is witness.95  His journey is one of discovery, but it is 
also one of purification.  Virgil embraces him as he acquires the correct attitude towards sin.96  
On the terraces of Purgatory his desires are continually refined, until the moment when he 
himself must pass through the purifying flames to “heal the final wound of all.”97  These flames 
are so hot that the pilgrim tells us “no sooner was I in that fire than I’d have thrown myself in 
molten glass to find coolness.”98  Virgil’s last words to the pilgrim declare that the pilgrim’s 
“will is free, erect, and whole…”99  Of all the desires that are purged in Inferno and Purgatorio, 
and despite the many questions answered in the lower reaches of Paradiso, the final, the most 
essential, of all desires in Dante’s heart is to understand the mystery of the relationship of God to 
human beings.  It is even more crucial in that it remains even after Dante the poet has placed 
Beatrice in the company of the saints.  Seen in this light, having an answer to this question of the 
relation of the divine to the human image is the aim of the entire poem, as if to suggest that it is 
this mystery that was always lurking behind the mystery of Dante’s love for Beatrice.  Dante 
provides an answer in the first canto of Paradiso.  The first canto is, as are the first cantos of 
Inferno and Purgatorio, a precis of the entire cantica.  The purpose of the journey through 
heaven appears with a neologism: “passing beyond the human” (transumanar), a purpose that 
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“cannot be worded.”100  Immediately afterward, as we might expect after such an announcement, 
we learn how—if words will not suffice—the purpose is to be fulfilled: “let Glaucus serve as 
simile—until grace grant you the experience.”101  The reference to Glaucus is to a story that 
appears in Ovid’s Metamorphoses; Glaucus was a fisherman who tasted a magic herb and 
became a sea-god.  Again, Dante invokes the theme of transformation, but the story can only be 
like the one Dante is telling in that general sense.  The transformation Dante the pilgrim 
undergoes is rather different in character, but with mention of this story, Dante seems to suggest 
that narrative, and perhaps narrative in poetry, can accomplish something that direct prose 
cannot.  If passing beyond the human cannot be explicated, perhaps it can be narrated.  What 
Dante finds in the Empyrean, he cannot tell of directly, but he can deploy his skill as a poet to 
describe to others how they, too, may attain this experience, and so finally understand what he 
describes.  As such, the Divina Commedia is a mystical itinerary.  Dante expresses this point 
explicitly in his letter to Can Grande: “But omitting all subtle investigation, it can be briefly 
stated that the aim of the whole and of the part is to remove those beings living in this life from a 
state of misery and to guide them to a state of happiness.”102 
Scholars who have examined the question of Dante’s relationship to mysticism have 
tended to focus on Paradiso (and with good reason, as the above discussion hopefully shows).  It 
is only in Paradiso that the essence of Dante’s mysticism is revealed.  But it is a mistake to 
suppose that Inferno and Purgatorio have no part in explicating Dante’s mysticism.  As we have 
seen above, one of the principle themes of Dante’s mysticism is the transformation of human 
desire, and as such, Dante must grapple with the human beings who are doing the desiring.  The 
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themes that dominate Inferno are commonplace enough in human life so as to be recognizable to 
the vast majority of potential readers of the Divina Commedia.  Much of the imagery of Inferno 
would have been not too dissimilar to actual experience.  Common modes of public execution 
included the tearing out of flesh with red-hot tongs, breaking on a wheel, being thrown from a 
height and left to die of starvation, dismemberment, and other such extremes of violence.103  The 
effects of battle on the bodies of human beings, combatants and otherwise, were both horrific 
and frequent.104  The great gushes of blood, gore, and excrement in the epic were an 
exaggeration of daily life in Medieval Europe, but not entirely off the mark.  Dante, in writing 
the Inferno, is in some sense holding up a mirror to the ordinary lives of ordinary people.  But it 
is also, critically, an inversion of the ideal of paradise, in the words of Dimitri Nikulin, a “mirror 
of the higher divine world, but this mirror is inevitably uneven, ragged and distorting, so that it 
never can adequately reflect and embody the initial intelligible harmony and beauty of the 
heavenly region.”105  The cannibalistic imagery that increases in savagery throughout the second 
half of Inferno to culminate in Lucifer munching the bodies of the three great traitors, has been 
interpreted by Sheila Nayar as distortions of the Eucharist.106  Hell is a divine creation,107 though 
its inhabitants have “lost all intellect.”108  As a mirror of daily life, Dante is merely showing his 
readers what is often read from the very first line of Inferno—that the lessons of his epic, though 
given to the pilgrim, are actually offered through the poem itself to every person.109  But the 
Pilgrim’s journey through hell remains part of Dante’s mystical itinerary. 
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Structurally, Inferno is part of the tripartite structure of the epic, which structure reflects 
the three persons of the trinity, the trifold division of time,110 and other tripartite schemes.  
Narratively, however, its presence is problematic, a fact obscured by (in the words of Nayar) 
“nearly 700 years of ways of reading” the Divina Commedia.111  The Pilgrim, waking in the dark 
wood, desires to travel to a sunlit hill (usually interpreted as purgatory), but he cannot.  Virgil 
appears to guide him.  Readers would notice nothing amiss had Dante chosen to have Virgil and 
the Pilgrim journey straight to Purgatory.  Virgil himself asks the Pilgrim why he doesn’t travel 
to Purgatory,112 and so Dante was surely aware that having his Pilgrim take the route directly to 
Purgatory would have made sense to readers.  Dante must therefore have had a purpose in 
diverting the Pilgrim through Hell, and indeed, we find that purpose in the Pilgrim’s answer to 
Virgil.  The journey through Hell is necessary because the “beast that is the cause of your outcry/ 
allows no man to pass along her track, but blocks him even to the point of death”113  Since no 
man will pass this beast, the other pathway, through Inferno, is the only one available to anyone 
wishing to reach the summit of Purgatory while yet alive.114  The apparent lesson is that no man 
(we should presumably read no person) can pass into the heavens unless he first travel through 
Hell, and thence to Purgatory.  The beast that blocks the Pilgrim blocks every person, and so the 
contemplative must travel through Inferno with the Pilgrim before climbing the face of the 
mountain of Purgatory and proceeding thence to experience of God in Heaven. 
The necessity of this seeming detour is a consequence of Dante’s central mystical theme, 
the transformation of human love and desire into divine love and desire for God.  As we later 
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learn, only one whose “heart has matured within the flame of love” can understand the path of 
salvation.115  The phrase “flame of love” (fiamma d’amore) suggests the burning passion—in 
short, the desire—that is such a large part of love for Dante.  The paradox of hell being a 
distorted mirror of heaven is that one can still learn something about heaven by investigating the 
distorted image carefully—if nothing else, one can learn what heaven does not look like.  The 
sinners in Inferno are trapped in their own distorted image, unable to grasp the undistorted image 
of God.  As the pilgrim is made to confront the image of sin after sin, he is shown a distorted, 
sometimes even a completely contradictory, view of life.116  The learning method employed by 
Dante is simply this: the reader is shown, along with the pilgrim, image after image of sin, as if 
to say to the reader “and this is not correct either.” At the same time, it is an accurate view of one 
part of human nature, characterized by the cast of hundreds, from all walks of life, who appear 
among the tormented in Inferno.  They are there, as Virgil tells us, because of Love, which is in 
itself a divine good, a gift from God.117  But it is perverted love, one that misdirects and distorts 
the human beings who possess it.  As the pilgrim progresses downward, he sees ever deeper 
levels of distortion, but by learning to reject them, he learns something of the nature of the 
undistorted image of heaven.  Therefore, as the pilgrim learns something about heaven by 
viewing its distorted image, he (and hence, the reader) learns something about the potential evils 
within himself, at least to the extent he is anything like the souls whose suffering he witnesses.  It 
is perhaps notable that those souls whose evil tendencies are most despicable are depicted by 
Dante as having lost their human form, visible as “wisps of straw in glass.”118  These sinners, 
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guilty of betrayal of their benefactors, have no place in Purgatory, by which arrangement Dante 
seems to suggest that it is possible to commit a crime so atrocious as to be forever cut off from 
divine grace.  Examples of people who have committed sins of incontinence or violence appear 
in Purgatory, but none who have committed either fraud or betrayal, as these are crimes beyond 
the power of transformation.  All other sins, however, can be repented, and—crucially—the 
motives that led to them reworked. 
The images carved into the side of the mountain at the start of each terrace on Purgatory 
present allegories of the manner of correcting each sin.  For example, in Purgatorio ten, we meet 
the prideful, and the first image presented in lines are of the Virgin Mary,119 humbly accepting 
her decreed place in God’s plan for salvation.  The next image is of those who labor to bear the 
Ark of the Covenant.120  The next is of King David, “less and more than a king.”121  These 
images together present part of the answer to the question that haunts Dante in his final vision: 
how does the human image fit into the divine?  But the question must be understood in an 
unusual way: Dante chooses (emphatically) not to answer it by description of the human image 
as part of the divine.  He cannot do that, every part of that image is beyond words.  Rather, he 
presents instructions to human beings by which they can witness the mystery for themselves, and 
the crucial part of the method is transformation of desire, which is a necessary prerequisite for 
attaining to direct experience of God.  In the transformation of desire by which the human being 
can achieve union with God, Inferno plays its role, as does Purgatory.  The images along the 
paths of Purgatory show by what means a human can fit herself into the divine image—that is, 
how she can attain union with the divine.  The punishments endured by the souls in Purgatory are 
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described, in this canto, as the means by which they “pay the debt [they] owe.”122  Once paid, 
these souls will be received into paradise in the afterlife; but by completing the same process 
while living, the Pilgrim (and by extension, a contemplative) is able to achieve union.   
This description of paying a debt in Purgatory raises a question about Inferno.  To the 
extent that the souls currently in hell are there for all eternity without hope of escape, they cannot 
be said to be paying a debt, at least not in the same way the souls in Purgatory are paying.  The 
punishments in Inferno are of a wholly different character than those in Purgatorio.  Each 
contrapasso follows on the sin of necessity—that is, the contrapassi we see in hell are essential 
properties of each sin.123  When we encounter the lustful, who are spun and driven about in a 
great whirling tempest, we are meant to understand that this is in some essential way what lust is 
truly like.  If this is the case, then those who lust in a sinful manner are, in the confines of their 
soul, already experiencing their punishment while yet alive on earth—they are blown about here 
and there by their base desires.  Their punishment is to remain in their sin.124  Similarly, the 
sowers of discord, who are presented in canto 27, are presented dismembered and split in half.  
Their mental apparatus, all their concepts and values, derive from the culture into which they are 
born.  The act of trying to split that culture, to polarize its members along some axis, is indicative 
of a split that must exist somewhere within the sower of discord first, a split from which the 
sinner already suffers.125  It is not a punishment in the usual sense of the term—it is not a 
negative condition or effect applied by some external agency.  Rather, the contrapassi of Inferno 
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are a depiction of the condition of the soul who sows discord—an articulation of the problem 
such a betrayal creates within the sinner.  The punishments endured in Hell are literal images of 
the sins they punish.  The story of Manfred from the third Canto of purgatory is the crucial 
episode for understanding this point.  Manfred explains that he repented with, quite literally, his 
last breath.  Dante writes that the grace of forgiveness is so great that those who, even for an 
instant, ask for grace are granted it, no matter how great their transgressions.126  So the sinners in 
Inferno are not people who chose a sin unaware of the consequence; they had experienced the 
nature of that sin, and had chosen to stay with their perverted love, unrepentant, down to the very 
last.  Dante employs them to display to his readers a compendium of mistakes on the path of 
transformation that leads to the highest vision.  In this process, Dante is like an alchemist 
removing all impurities from the prima materia before transforming it.  The desire which alone 
can propel one towards the beatific vision and direct access to God is, like the pilgrim at the start 
of the Divina Commedia, in a dark wood, mired by sin.  Virgil, to continue the alchemical 
analogy, finds him and purifies him by degrees.  But this purification is not the same as 
purgation in the standard itinerary; that process occurs (as we would expect) on the slopes of the 
mountain of Purgatory, and is only foreshadowed in Inferno.    
What is happening in Inferno is much closer to illumination.  As each sin presents itself 
before the Pilgrim, a lesson is learned.  And the final lesson is a reorientation, presented as a 
literal inversion on the very shanks of Lucifer in the final canto of Inferno.127  In the mythology 
of the Divina Commedia, it is Lucifer’s fall to earth which both makes possible the temptation in 
the garden that leads to the original sin, but his fall also creates the mountain of Purgatory, on 
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which sinners are relieved of the burden of their sins.128  Like the desire that Beatrice represents, 
Lucifer is both the origin of the perennial problem, and the cause of the mechanism of its 
redemption.  Lucifer is presented as the final vision in Inferno, the final lesson that seems to 
distill all the lessons of Hell.  In his influential essay The Muted Self-Referentiality of Dante’s 
Lucifer, Dino Cervigni observes that 
By way of disconvenientia [disproportionality], the Pilgrim is set apart from 
Lucifer and what characterizes hell's king most specifically, namely, his 
primordial rebellion against the Verbum and his eternal deprivation of the word.  
By way of convenientia [proportionality], on the contrary, the Pilgrim is likened 
to what Lucifer stands for....Throughout the Pilgrim's infernal journey, from the 
moment he becomes lost in the dark forest, he is in fact caught in this dialectical 
rapport of convenientia and disconvenietia with Lucifer.  As the Pilgrim's infernal 
journey nears completion, his convenientia and disconvenientia vis-a-vis Lucifer 
reach a climax.129 
 
For Cervigni, the Pilgrim has been in a kind of dialogue with Lucifer from the very start of his 
journey.  All the horrors of hell owe their existence to Lucifer, and the Pilgrim has, on his 
journey, seen aspects of himself in some of them—and no doubt, readers of the Divina 
Commedia will see aspects of themselves therein.  But in this supremely infernal moment, the 
Pilgrim undergoes a reorientation, one at which he has been aiming the whole time.  If not for the 
presence of Lucifer, neither the lessons learned in confronting each sin, nor the reorientation 
towards Purgatory, would be possible.130  It is by confronting Lucifer that the first real 
transformation of desire, in the form of reorientation, occurs. 
The work of contemplation transforms the contemplative, but care must be taken that not 
just any transformation takes place, because sin, far from being external to the contemplative, is 
an indelible feature of her own soul.  The mystical itinerary is a process that, by its most 
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fundamental nature, bound up as it is with desire, can lead those who enter upon it astray.  In 
Dante’s understanding of sin as presented by Virgil on the slopes of the mountain of Purgatory, 
the desire for direct experience of God is just the same kind of motive that leads to desire for 
other things, including those that are the objects of sin (lust, violence, power, pride, etc.).  The 
mystical path is then, for Dante, a path on which there is but a single motive force, and it must be 
the business of the contemplative to ensure that the target of that force is the right one.  This 
conception of how mystical theology works on a practical level is a far cry from the manner in 
which mystics prior to Dante thought about the task of contemplation.  As we will see, 
recognition that a contemplative could go wrong due precisely to the motive forces of the 
mystical journey itself was not a point for which provision was made in mystical itineraries prior 
to Dante.  But after the circulation of the Divina Commedia, mystics became increasingly 
concerned to both investigate sin as a source of wisdom, and also to warn contemplatives against 
a growing catalog of mistakes along the path.  The most manifest sign of Dante’s influence on 
later mystics is the apparent fact that mystical itineraries, and the attitudes of mystics towards 
sin, began to change shortly after the circulation of the Divina Commedia. 
 
Section III: Mystical Itineraries Prior to Dante 
 As I argued in the previous section, Inferno is a necessary episode in Dante’s mystical 
itinerary—for Dante, it cannot be expunged or avoided.  The pilgrim’s journey through hell is a 
consequence of certain features of Dante’s mysticism—most especially, Dante’s understanding 
that desire is the primary engine of progress on the mystical path, but desire must be transformed 
before union with God can be achieved.  In placing a journey through hell, and the attendant 
examination of sin, on his itinerary, Dante departs sharply from itineraries that had been written 
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prior to the Divina Commedia.  It is one of the central points of this thesis that a change in the 
manner in which mystics viewed the relationship between the contemplative and sin can be 
observed beginning shortly after circulation of the Divina Commedia.  Before circulation of the 
Divina Commedia, as we will see below, mystics either mostly ignored the subject of sin, or 
advised contemplatives to avoid any investigation of sin.  After circulation of the Divina 
Commedia, however, mystics began to advise contemplatives to investigate sin, and even 
inserted episodes analogous to Inferno into their own itineraries.  In this section, I aim to show 
that the notion that an investigation of sin is useful or necessary to contemplatives was absent in 
mystical itineraries prior to the latter half of the fourteenth century—with the exception of the 
Divina Commedia itself.  The Divina Commedia is the first itinerary to include a journey through 
hell and an investigation of sin.  In this section, after a brief overview of the historical roots of 
mystical itineraries in the Latin West, we shall examine some of the more well-known itineraries 
written prior to the fourteenth century.  As we shall see, itineraries prior to the Divina Commedia 
either ignored the subject of sin, or actively discouraged contemplatives from thinking about or 
looking at sin. 
Mystical itineraries as they exist in the mysticism of the Medieval Latin West have two 
main historical roots.  Perhaps the most pervasively influential historical root is to be found in 
the writings of that unknown fifth century mystic Dionysius.  His primary itinerary, The Mystical 
Theology, not only coined the eponymous phrase, it had a profound and far-reaching influence 
on the entire corpus of Christian mysticism.131  His primary contribution to mystical thought is 
the juxtaposition of both positive and negative ways of conceiving God.  Positive theology—that 
is, theology that attributes some definite quality or property to God—has a place in the thought 
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of Dionysius.  But for Dionysius, it is also necessary to recognize the impossibility of any 
positive set of qualities or properties adequately conceiving God, who is always more than we 
are capable of grasping.132  If the contemplative is to be raised up to heaven, she must pass to a 
place beyond the ability of the mind to grasp or describe, implying humility in the recognition 
that human powers of cognition cannot grasp the divine.133 The idea that mystical ascent only 
comes about through profound humility comes to fruition in Bernard of Clairvaux’s Steps of 
Humility and Pride, and leaves some traces on Bonaventure’s Journey of the Soul into God, in 
which each step on the mystical path involves both a positive or acquisitive task, and a negative 
or banishing task.   William Anderson sees some influence of Dionysius’ apophatic theology in 
Dante’s Pilgrim’s journey into heaven in that the final vision in Paradiso cannot be entirely 
articulated or grasped by the mind.134 
The second historical root and the earliest explicitly Christian mystical itinerary was 
propounded by Origen of Alexandria, in his Twenty-Seventh Homily on the Book of Numbers.  
As an itinerary, this work is a difficult one, as it is phrased as a commentary on the book of 
Numbers—it is not presented as a mystical itinerary per se, though it came to be read as such by 
the next generation of mystics, including Ambrose of Milan and Gregory the Great (540-604).135  
Though it consists of forty-two stages of attainment, in broad strokes it recapitulates Origen’s 
earlier commentary on the three books of Solomon.136  Proverbs presents, on Origen’s reading, 
moral knowledge.  Ecclesiastes presents natural science, knowledge about the created things and 
the uses for which God intended us to use them.  Finally, the Song of Songs presents mystical 
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knowledge, that is, knowledge of union with God.  Contemplatives attain direct experience of 
God, implies Origen, by concentrating on, and moving through, these areas of knowledge 
(importantly) in order from moral knowledge to mystical knowledge.  At the beginning of the 
mystical journey, the contemplative must be concerned with knowledge of how to conduct 
herself, and how to avoid sin.  In the second stage, the contemplative meditates on the created 
universe and attempts to understand it.  In the third, the contemplative finally becomes a mystic, 
attaining union with God. 
The first stage, that of purgation, may seem to be the most obviously relevant for this 
thesis, since Inferno is the cantica that most seems to be about sin.  But a sharp distinction in the 
attitude toward sin to be taken by the contemplative can be observed in comparing Inferno to the 
first stage of Origen’s itinerary.  In that first stage, Origen reads Proverbs and the moral 
knowledge it presents entirely through the lens of the complete avoidance of sin—that is, the 
contemplative is to refrain from even being in proximity, bodily and mentally, to any instance of 
sin.137  In Origen’s writing, sin is an inevitable consequence of sexual reproduction and of being 
embodied in matter, and only belief in Christ enables human beings to overcome sin.138  Sin is an 
all-or-nothing phenomenon—one either sins or does not sin.139  As such, there is very little to 
understand about sin beyond the fact that sin is of the devil and only Christ can deliver a person 
from a state of sin.  Though Origen seldom mentions them, ascetic practices were universally 
prescribed to avoid sin, and were almost universally perceived as the most efficacious, if not the 
sole, means of doing so.140  While it is wise, in Origen’s view, to avoid sin, investigation of sin 
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itself does not lead to wisdom, an attitude that would guide mystical itineraries for an entire 
millennium after Origen, as we will see.  Origen’s tripartite scheme of purgation, illumination, 
and union became the standard to which itineraries conformed until the circulation of the Divina 
Commedia.  This standard form was adopted by Gregory the Great in his Homily on Ezekiel, in 
which he describes Christian life as occurring in three stages, in which one first turns back to the 
self, then one examines the self, and then, in the final stage, one transcends the self.141  Gregory’s 
itinerary provides an example of the power of the tripartite scheme introduced by Origen.  As 
McGinn notes, Gregory produced a number of itineraries as briefer parts of larger works, though 
his chief concern was always the incessant struggle of living as a Christian, and turning away 
from the world—a process Gregory perceived as an ongoing struggle that could not be divided 
into stages.142 
John Climacus’ Ladder of Divine Ascent, written in the mid-seventh century, is the 
earliest itinerary written specifically as an itinerary in the Latin West.  Where Origen’s itinerary 
had to be deduced from his commentary on scripture, and Gregory’s appears as a small part of a 
larger work, Climacus’ Ladder is explicitly and exclusively an itinerary.  While Climacus 
refrains from offering practical advice for spiritual combat, the Ladder nevertheless illustrates 
the central point that early Christian mystics conceived of sin as caused by external forces to be 
shunned and avoided rather than investigated and engaged.  Indeed, Climacus writes as if 
convinced of the efficacy, for combatting sin, of making confession and taking vows of 
contemplation.  In his Ladder, to illustrate exactly this point, he relates the story of a renowned 
robber and murderer who experiences pangs of conscience and fear for his own soul.  These 
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pangs and fears become so oppressive, and his need to be close to God so strong, that he seeks 
out a monastery and asks to be admitted.  The abbot suggests he take a week to live in the 
monastery, and then decide.  The robber does so, and at the end of the week, his resolve not 
wavering, he is dragged before the brethren to confess his sins.  He makes his confession, and as 
he does, Climacus writes that one of the brethren reported seeing a terrifying man holding a pen 
and a book, and at each sin confessed, the man crossed something out in his book.143  
Importantly, Climacus refrains from saying, in anything more than a vague manner, just what 
sins the man had committed—rather as if the sins themselves were of little consequence.   
Throughout the remainder of the Ladder, Climacus dispenses advice for not falling into 
sin, though this advice is rather uniform: one should simply avoid it where possible, and shun it 
where it cannot be avoided.  When one is overcome by some sin, calling out to the Lord may 
help.144  Sin is something that comes from outside the contemplative in Climacus’ itinerary.  
Climacus seems to have either invented, or inherited from some unknown source, some lore 
about the causal connections—some more plausible than others—between sins and either 
psychological or bodily states.  For example, unwarranted jesting is sometimes occasioned by 
lust,145 while hardness-of-heart can result from overeating.146  Climacus recognizes these causal 
connections as essentially unintelligible, but nevertheless affirms them.  They are not wisdom, he 
says, because they are too chaotic, do not hold often, and present no means of practical help.147  
Climacus concludes that the only remedy of use against any and all sin is humility.148  He is 
                                                 
143 This story appears in: Climacus, Ladder of Divine Ascent, 11. 
144 Ibid., 29. 
145 Ibid., 94. 
146 Ibid., 94. 
147 Ibid., 93. 
148 Climacus, Ladder, 95. 
43 
 
explicit that all sin and all temptation comes from demons, who cannot attack a humble 
person.149 
Of special interest in comparison to Dante, Climacus reverses the order of severity of sins 
between those of pride and those of lust; the former are merely pitiful, while the latter are a fatal 
error.150  Recall that, for Dante, desire or love is the engine of progress on the mystical path, and 
as such, its close image lust cannot be the most grievous sin.  And yet for Climacus, as for a 
number of other medieval theologians, lust is a mortal sin,151 especially as the means by which 
original sin is propagated from one generation to another.  This reversal of the place of lust in 
Dante’s theology suggests that he has rethought the nature of sin and its role in human life.  
Where earlier mystics were ready to condemn lust as the most severe of sins, Dante’s reappraisal 
suggests a readiness to accept the desire which causes lust as a necessary quality on the mystical 
journey.  Such an idea had not been contemplated by earlier mystics, who saw in lust simply an 
external temptation that had to be resisted at all costs by the contemplative.  The notion that there 
might be something about lust worth preserving even as the contemplative proceeds through the 
stages of purgation to attain union with the divine was not one that featured in mystical 
itineraries before the fourteenth century.  Even Mechtilde of Magdeburg, whose sensual imagery 
is among the most potently erotic in the writings of mystics before Dante, makes clear that she 
despises the appetites of the body, and that the apparent sensuality of her prose is mere 
metaphor.152 
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Not all itineraries dealt with the subject of lust in any depth.  Such is the case with what is 
perhaps the most well-known itinerary of the High Medieval Period, Bernard of Clairvaux’s 
Steps of Humility and Pride.  Of the itineraries examined in this section, none is clearer that 
investigation of sin is anathema for the contemplative.  Investigation of sin, according to Bernard 
of Clairvaux, is itself a pathway to sin.  In The Steps of Humility and Pride, Bernard writes that  
Leave was given to thee to eat of every tree in Paradise, except that one which is 
called the tree of knowledge of good and evil.  For if the others are good and have 
a good savour, what need is there to eat of one which also has an evil savour? Not 
to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise.  For to know evil is not knowledge 
but folly.153 
 
Bernard’s explicit view is that investigating evil is a product of curiosity, and even to look at the 
fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil may not itself be a sin, but there is a sin 
“somewhere in the background,” and the act of looking will “lead you on to sin.”154  Bernard 
may have in mind a medieval theory of vision, itself based on Augustin’s theory of vision, 
according to which an image can impart psychological or even physical effects to the seer.  This 
theory may help to explain why mystics before the fourteenth century, and to some extent even 
afterward, refrained from advising contemplatives to investigate sin.  The fear was that looking 
at sin with either the physical or spiritual vision (i.e. imagination) would cause it to enter into the 
one doing the looking, with deleterious consequences.  Theories of vision formulated by 
Augustin, according to which an inner intellectual vision and also an imaginal spiritual vision 
coexisted with physical vision survived well into the Renaissance, though not without challenge 
starting in the fourteenth century.155  Often, such theories postulated concomitant action on the 
part of physical vision along with at least one of the other two kinds of vision, such that an image 
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presented to the physical eye could carry into the soul of the seer some spiritual or intellectual 
force.156  These, in turn, were sometimes thought to manifest physical effects—this was the 
theory behind what is usually called Medieval astral or image magic.157  Quinlan-McGrath points 
out that Christian theologians, philosophers, and mystics were generally taken with the causal 
powers of light, since God was supposed to have created by first calling light into being.158  As 
such, vision, as the sense through which light entered, was particularly sensitive to outside 
influences.  Intellectual and spiritual vision came to be bundled together with physical vision in 
that the same effects were understood to be occasioned by images residing in the mind.159  This 
theory helps us understand, to some extent, why an investigation of sin would have been 
considered deleterious by mystics, especially before the fourteenth century.  When we 
understand that this theory was both far-reaching and widespread,160 it becomes clear that 
mystics had powerful theoretical reasons to counsel not mere avoidance of sin, but to tread 
lightly around the subject in their own writings.  It also gives us some appreciation of the extent 
of Dante’s innovation, which cut across not merely the traditions of theology, but also theories of 
vision and the lore those theories occasioned. 
A partial survival of this doctrine that seeing something evil causes the evil to enter into 
the one who is seeing may be present in canto IX of Inferno, in which Virgil physically turns the 
pilgrim around so that he cannot see Medusa.161  The power of the gaze of Medusa to turn a 
viewer to stone was not a Medieval invention, though Dante adopts it, perhaps with the 
understanding that the ancient monster and the consequence of her gaze, though an extreme case 
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with physical effects, was in harmony with then-current theories of vision.  Interestingly, this is 
one of only a few times when Virgil discourages the pilgrim to look at sinners and their 
punishments in Inferno; his most common advice is to look and understand what is before 
him.162  The one time when Virgil offers clear advice to the contrary163 suggests that Dante 
agrees that something evil or sinful may enter in through the senses, but the many admonitions 
by Virgil to look and understand suggest Dante has a very different view than Bernard or other 
mystics who had gone before Dante.  The contrast between Dante’s Inferno, whose advice is 
promulgated in dramatic fashion mainly through the speech of Virgil, and Bernard’s, is clear.  
Because the error of sin is already within the contemplative, and is tied to the very engine of 
mystical progress, in Dante’s view, examination of sin is necessary.  In Bernard’s view, since sin 
is essentially caused by external forces that have the power to enter into a person through the 
senses, investigation of sin is foolhardy. 
Bernard’s Steps is not the only itinerary he produced.  Another one occurs among his 
sermons on the Song of Songs.  The seventh, eighth, and ninth sermons outline a tripartite 
itinerary based on the words “let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth.”164  Bernard develops 
some lore about the spiritual meaning of kisses mentioned in the text, and he posits three such 
kisses—on the feet, the hands, and the mouth.  These correspond, roughly, with the stages of the 
standard itinerary.  Unlike his Steps, Bernard makes no explicit comments about sin in these 
sermons.  Lack of comment on sin, or mention only in passing, is the most common treatment 
the subject of sin receives in mystical itineraries prior to the circulation of the Divina Commedia. 
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The most well-known itinerary to be produced in the century before Dante’s life was 
Bonaventure’s The Soul’s Journey into God.  In its structure, Bonaventure’s itinerary can be 
analyzed in a number of ways, though it is most commonly understood to consist of seven parts.  
Six of those parts are based on the three kinds of vision considered by Augustin—physical, 
spiritual, and intellectual.165  The soul first considers material things (seen by physical vision), 
then interior things (perceived by the spiritual vision), and finally, the things of heaven 
(perceived by the intellectual vision).166  Ultimately, every stage is meant to reinforce and guide 
the contemplative to a final ecstasy of union with God,167 but there is a clear resemblance to the 
standard itinerary.  As the contemplative moves through the first stage, she is purged of sin.  In 
the second, she receives illumination, and in, or through, the third, union with God is attained. In 
this final point, Bonaventure’s itinerary resembles the Pilgrim’s journey, which ends in a final 
supreme vision.  In its treatment of sin, however, there is a clear distinction between 
Bonaventure’s itinerary and the Divina Commedia.  Like Bernard, Bonaventure counsels 
avoidance of sin, though he does not offer any advice for how to do so.  He writes merely that 
whoever wishes to be united with God must “first avoid sin.”168  Bonaventure refrains from 
mentioning specific sins, or developing a general theory of sin in his itinerary.169  Unlike 
Climacus, Bonaventure leaves us little clue to understand why he more or less ignores sin—
though as we will see below, there were powerful theoretical reasons to think that any 
investigation of sin was superfluous, if not harmful, to the contemplative.  Bonaventure’s 
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itinerary is more typical of itineraries prior to the Divina Commedia in that Bonaventure more or 
less ignores sin. 
  Climacus’ Ladder and Bernard’s Steps are extraordinary precisely because they say 
more than just a few lines about the subject of sin.  Where sin is mentioned in any kind of detail 
in these exceptional itineraries, the contemplative is advised to avoid it through ascetic practice, 
to refrain from looking at it, and is never advised to go looking for it.  This advice is precisely 
what Dante, through Virgil, repudiates.  As the pilgrim descends through the rings of hell, he is 
generally encouraged to look and understand, and given that the Divina Commedia may be read 
as mystical itinerary, this act of looking and understanding is part of that itinerary.  The Divina 
Commedia thus deviates substantially from mystical itineraries prior to its circulation. 
 One possible reply to this analysis would be one hinted at above, that the pilgrim’s 
descent through hell is a kind of figuration of the descent described by Dionysius.  Scholars have 
certainly likened the descent though hell with the Dionysian descent.170  But such a reply is 
weakened when we recognize that, like the other itineraries prior to the circulation of the Divina 
Commedia, Dionysius does not advise anything like an investigation of sin.  Like other early 
mystics, Dionysius refrains from spending much time discussing sin in his itinerary, the Mystical 
Theology.  He does mention it in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, but in a manner consistent with 
the treatment given by Climacus; Dionysius prescribes an essentially magical remedy, in which 
the ceremony of initiation into a monastic order, or into the priesthood, banishes sin.171  He is 
quick to add that contemplatives will continue to have to deal with sin, but the application of 
ascetic practices will be the cure.172  The notion that investigation of sin might form a potential 
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means of illumination for the contemplative is as alien to Dionysius as it is for other mystics 
prior to circulation of the Divina Commedia.  Moreover, the descent of which Dionysius writes is 
not the descent of the mystic; he writes about the descent of God, and the descent of souls into 
matter.  He does not describe the mystical path itself as, or partially as, a descent.  For Bernard, 
the descent that forms part of the mystical path is a descent into humility, a metaphorical 
lowering of oneself from the towers of pride into a willingness to surrender to Christ.173  It is 
tempting to view this lowering in Dionysian terms—perhaps it is precisely the essentially 
negative recognition that God is utterly beyond the ability of the human mind to grasp that brings 
one to a state of humility.  But Inferno does not seem written so as to teach the reader to think of 
God in purely negative terms.  It appears, rather, to be a discourse on sin, and in the ways that 
human beings can go astray from the pathway that leads to salvation.  As such, it is the first 
mystical itinerary to recommend an examination of sin in the history of the western mystical 
tradition.  
Space prevents us from making an examination of literally every mystical itinerary 
composed up to the turn of the fourteenth century.  Moreover, it is unlikely that we know about 
all relevant pieces of writing by all mystics who were alive before the fourteenth century.   One 
obvious problem therefore presents itself.  The claim I am making is that no itineraries in the 
Latin West prior to the Divina Commedia included an examination of sin, and further, that no 
mystics in the Latin West prior to Dante saw any use for contemplatives making any kind of 
detailed investigation of sin.  But while examination of examples is important for understanding 
the context of Dante’s innovation on the mystical itinerary, no possible examination of examples 
could show conclusively that Dante was the first mystic to recognize the value of an 
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investigation of sin to a contemplative.  However, as we saw above in the discussion of early 
theories of vision, mystics had reasons to advise contemplatives to avoid investigating sin.  As I 
shall now argue, even more powerful reasons for avoiding sin existed for mystics prior to Dante.  
Prevailing theories of evil and sin from the fourth through to the fourteenth centuries predisposed 
mystics to think that investigation of sin would be detrimental to a contemplative. 
 Medieval theories of sin were intimately tied to theories of evil and its origin.  Christian 
philosophers recognized the theological problem posed by the existence of evil.  God is 
presumed to be wholly good, and as the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe, it is 
puzzling that He would create a universe in which evil exists.  To solve this problem, Augustin 
held that all being is wholly good, while evil is the privation of good.  As such, evil is also the 
privation of being, since no being can be anything other than good.174  Human souls are created 
in the image of God, and so are themselves complete beings.  Sin, on Augustin’s account, is a 
corruption of a human soul and a privation of the original being of the soul.  Importantly for the 
present discussion, according to Augustin’s account, evil was not itself a being.175  A thing is, on 
Augustin’s account, just to the extent that it is good.176  Aquinas clarified Augustin’s account by 
distinguishing evil as a being, and evil being, acknowledging that the latter existed.177  In making 
this acknowledgement, Aquinas was also acknowledging then-current folklore about the nature 
of temptation—specifically, that it was often caused by demons, who were objective beings 
external to the contemplative.178  The tradition of spiritual combat against demons began with the 
desert fathers, and continued into Climacus’ itinerary.  But while demons appear as objective 
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being in Inferno, they appear specifically in hell.179  They are not embodiments of sin as they 
were in the folklore that arose out of the earliest experience of contemplatives in the Egyptian 
desert.180    Sins are, in this theoretical framework, caused by demons.  One of the first tasks on 
the mystical path before the fourteenth century was to escape those demons, not to investigate 
them, which would necessitate coming into proximity with them.  The point is that neither 
orthodox theology nor everyday lore gave mystics any reason to suppose that mystics should 
undertake an investigation of sin.  Indeed, it gave them ample reason to suppose that 
investigation of sin would be harmful to a contemplative.  The plain reason that itineraries 
examined in this section did not counsel that contemplatives examine sin is because they could 
see no reason for such an examination, and potent reasons to counsel against it.  As we saw in 
the previous section, Dante developed a different understanding of the nature of sin itself, and so 
he understood that an investigation of sin is a source of wisdom, and indeed necessary, to 
contemplatives.   
Dante’s innovation may be a result of his understanding of desire, which differed sharply 
from that of mystics before his time.  In the previous section, we saw that Dante understood 
desire as the engine of progress on the mystical path, and this is likely the reason he held that lust 
is among the least severe of sins.  One thing that Climacus, Bernard, and Bonaventure had in 
common among themselves and with other mystics before Dante is that they made a sharp 
distinction between earthly desire and heavenly or spiritual desires.  For example, though 
Bonaventure praises the “man of desires,”181 he also clearly counsels against indulging or (to the 
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extent possible) even having earthly desires.182  Similarly, Bernard advises contemplatives to 
extinguish their own earthly desires,183 and he clearly repudiates any kind of lust.184  But he 
nevertheless lauds desire for union with God.185  Dante differs from such analyses in that he sees 
no distinction between earthly and spiritual desire just as such.  The only distinction lies in their 
objects.  This recognition is what makes Inferno a necessary episode for Dante.  If a 
contemplative extinguishes desire, as Bonaventure or Bernard advise, she will also extinguish the 
means by which she can attain to union with God.  For Dante, such desire must be transformed, 
and so first it must be understood and examined in its baser aspects, and those aspects must be 
rejected and reformed, rather than extinguishing desire outright.  Accomplishing this rejection 
and transformation of desire is part of the purpose of the journey through Inferno—a purpose 
that had not been understood to be necessary in the views of mystics before Dante. 
 
Section IV: Mystical Thought after the Divina Commedia 
 As we have seen, the Divina Commedia, when read as a mystical itinerary, departs 
substantially from mystical itineraries prior to its circulation.  Since mystical itineraries are 
predicated and constructed on the mystical theologies of the mystics who write them, with 
generally accepted theological doctrine in the background, we may infer that Dante differed in 
his own mystical theology from that of mystics who had come before him.  His primary point of 
departure from prior mystical thought is to be found in the insight that the engine of progress 
along the mystical path is also a potential source of error, and thus, the transformation of desire 
and human love into divine love is the only path by which a contemplative (or indeed any 
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person) may attain direct experience of God.  Investigation of sin is a necessary step along this 
path, in order to recognize, among many distorted reflections, the true image of divine love.  
Those distorted images provide the contemplative with information about that true image, and 
hence, they are a source of wisdom on the mystical path. 
 While the works produced by later mystics suggest the wide-spread influence of Dante 
and his ‘brand’ of mystical itinerary, it is impossible to prove that any of the mystics covered in 
this section had read the Divina Commedia.  Two chief difficulties present themselves.  The first 
is that little is known about the lives of the mystics to be discussed.  The other difficulty is the 
fact that mystics of this period, when quoting or paraphrasing anything, would typically limit 
themselves to scripture or the writings of the Church Fathers.186  What we will not find are 
mentions of Dante, quotes, or paraphrases in the writings of mystics to some passage in the 
Divina Commedia.  Nevertheless, we will begin to see reflections of Dante’s principle 
innovations in mystical theology.  Let us recall that his principle innovations were these: 
1. The notion that examination of sin can be a source of wisdom for the mystic. 
2. Desire as both the source of sin and also the engine of progress on the mystical path. 
3. Interpolation of Inferno as a necessary episode on the mystical itinerary. 
All of the mystics examined in this section do exhibit some influence from the Divina 
Commedia, adopting one or more of these innovations into their own thought.  To the extent we 
can find Dante’s innovations in the literature of mysticism so long after the circulation of the 
Divina Commedia, we ought to trace credit for them to Dante’s authorship. As we saw in the last 
section, mystics included no examination of sin or episode analogous to Inferno in their 
itineraries.  Desire did figure into mystical literature before the Divina Commedia, though always 
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distinguished into earthly and heavenly or spiritual desire.  As we will see in this section, mystics 
after Dante began to incorporate these ideas into their own thought. 
Before getting to this analysis, however, we must first address the question of 
readership—did the mystics to be examined here have access to the Divina Commedia?  Given 
the popularity of the Divina Commedia, it seems safe to say that the Divina Commedia had 
formed part of the cultural “background” of Europe by the middle of the fifteenth century.187  
When we get to the great Spanish mystics of the sixteenth century, concerned as they were with 
Catholic identity and counter-Reformation, the Divina Commedia was likely part of the de rigeur 
literature of humanist education.188  By this time, nearly two centuries had passed since the 
Divina Commedia had first begun to circulate, enough time for it to soak into then-current ideas 
and literature.  We know enough about the lives of the two Spanish mystics considered below 
(Ignatius of Loyola and Teresa of Avila), and the influence the Divina Commedia had on later 
Spanish literature, to make reasonable inferences that both likely either had read the Divina 
Commedia, or at least were familiar with its stories and structure. 
But the earlier mystics to be covered in this period, Johann van Ruysbroeck and Julian of 
Norwich, present more of a problem when it comes to the question of readership.  The problem 
of readership on Johann’s part is compounded by the fact that we know little about his life, and 
hence we do not always know precisely where to look for manuscripts or other evidence when 
attempting to discover his sources.  What is known about Ruysbroeck’s life is derived mainly 
from a brief but problematic biographical sketch written by Henricus Pomerius (d. 1469) forty 
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years after Johann’s death, and a short vita composed about him by Gerard of Saintes (fl. 1350-
1363), a Carthusian monk living in the charterhouse in Herne, just southwest of Brussels, with 
whom Johann had both corresponded and conversed in person.189  Arguing in favor of the 
validity of the information contained in this vita is the fact that its author knew Johann 
personally—a claim that cannot be made of Pomerius’ biographical sketch.  Gerard’s vita 
suggests that Johann may have embarked on a study-tour to the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris 
sometime before he settled in Groendal in 1343, a fact that cannot be confirmed as the Abbey’s 
guest book over the period in question has been damaged—however, it is known that Johann 
submitted his Groendal Priory to the rule of the Abbey in 1345, and he seems to have maintained 
some connection to scholars at the University of Paris, which had absorbed the Abbey school in 
1301.190  Johann was clearly educated somewhere; he was ordained to the clergy in 1317 and, 
until his departure for Groendal in 1343, Johann enjoyed access to a large library, said to be 
filled with many illuminated manuscripts, which was owned by his uncle Jan Hinckaert (d. 1350) 
until Johann’s departure for Groendal in 1343.191  Despite the uncertainties that remain about 
Johann’s life, nothing about the vita recommends its unreliability, and I will proceed on the 
assumption that Johann likely did study at the Abbey of St. Victor prior to 1343, and had access 
to a large library of manuscripts in Brussels. 
The Divina Commedia was not circulated as a single work, but rather, each of the 
cantiche were circulated separately, and only collected into single manuscripts after the 
completion of Paradiso in 1319-20.192  Partial Latin translations and commentaries on Inferno 
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and Purgatorio were circulating in the first half of the fourteenth century,193 with the first known 
complete Latin translation finished in 1330 in Milan.194 Dante’s work was known well enough in 
Germany to have been mentioned at a meeting of the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire in 
1338.195  By the 1370’s, copies of the Divina Commedia had travelled as far east as Budapest,196 
as far west as Andalusia,197 and as far North as England.198  Unfortunately, the Abbey school of 
St. Victor in Paris was damaged during the 1789 Revolution, and no known catalogs of 
manuscripts available in the library where Johann is thought to have studied exists.  
Nevertheless, the obvious popularity of the earliest circulating manuscripts of the Divina 
Commedia, coupled with the intensely humanistic philosophy of education at the Abbey school 
and its policy of acquiring manuscripts,199 suggests that the Divina Commedia would have been 
available to Johann during his time in Paris. This probability is increased when we observe that 
there are some similarities in Johann’s thought and Dante’s.   
Johann never wrote a work specifically intended as an itinerary.  Although brief sketches 
of various mystical itineraries aimed at different aspects of the mystical task occur throughout 
Johann’s work, distilling a single itinerary from these fragments is a daunting task.  By 
comparison of Johann’s three most well-known works, The Spiritual Espousals (likely composed 
in the late 1330s), the Sparkling Stone (likely composed in the 1340s), and The Book of Supreme 
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Truth (likely composed after 1345 but before 1360), it is possible to at least rough out the 
itinerary lurking within his thought. 
Johann held that there are two kinds of union with God, a union through means and a 
union without means.200  The means by which one achieves the first kind of union include 
prayer, receiving the Eucharist, contemplation of images or icons, imaginal meditation, reading 
scripture, and practicing the virtues of faith, hope, and charity.  The union without means is 
higher than the union with means, because the union without means is free of any kind of 
external attachment or content of imagination, allowing the mystic to enter first into darkness, 
then nakedness, and finally nothingness.201  Arising again and again in Johann’s writings are the 
terms: inwardness, love, rest, activity, and essential unity.202  Johann’s mystical theology is 
essentially inward; he never mentions the demons that so concern Climacus.  Nor does he 
counsel against examination of sin as does Bernard, nor ignore it as does Bonaventure.  For 
Johann, sin is as inward a phenomenon as holiness, and he seems always concerned with all the 
ways a mystic can fall into error, even sinful error.203  For Johann, human souls are an image, 
albeit a distorted image, of God,204 and it is this fact that allows human beings to correct the 
distortions in their soul so as to attain union with God by inversion into the perfected soul, where 
God dwells.  But an almost literal inversion of self is required to attain this union, which goes 
some way towards explaining why Johann adopts such language as sinking into an abyss or 
falling into rest to describe the nature of that union.  Though Johann does not employ imagery or 
allegory, we are nevertheless reminded of the inversion of the Pilgrim and his guide on the 
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shanks of Lucifer.  At this moment in Inferno, this inversion is necessary to leave hell, and hence 
the inversion is a necessary step before leaving the realm of sin and moving on to the stage in the 
mystical itinerary represented by Purgatory.  The inversion of the Pilgrim is, in this sense, 
analogous to the inversion prescribed by Johann.  Both Johann and Dante before him appreciate 
that making progress on the mystical path requires an inversion of self at the very beginning of 
the contemplative’s journey—and inversion that must remain permanent throughout the 
remainder of one’s life.  Dante emphasizes the moment of inversion through a direct address to 
the reader.205  We should recall, however, that the entirety of the episode of Inferno was made 
necessary through a deeper insight about the nature of desire and its role on the mystical journey. 
The primary similarity between Dante’s thought and Johann’s is that Johann seems to 
have understood Dante’s key insight that desire is the engine of progress on the mystical path.  
Like Dante, Johann recognized that precisely the thing that serves as the engine of motion along 
the mystical itinerary is also itself dangerous.  Johann is constantly writing about the ways in 
which mystics, even those who have rejected sin per the prescriptions of Climacus or Bernard, 
could go wrong.206  Writing of such men, he says: 
And this was well understood by St. Paul, when he said that he had a desire to 
depart and to be with Christ.  But he did not say that he had a desire to be Christ 
Himself or God; as is done by some unbelieving and perverse men, who say that 
they have no God, but that they are so wholly dead to themselves, and united with 
God, that they have themselves become God.207 
 
Passages such as this one pepper Johann’s writings, earning him a reputation in his lifetime as a 
heresy-hunter.  More recent scholarly reappraisals have suggested this is an inaccurate picture of 
Johann’s work,208 partially because he never presented himself as a heresy hunter, and seems to 
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have preferred to retire from, rather than engage in, public controversy.  What is the error 
committed by those “perverse men” mentioned in the previous passage?  Johann explains: 
Behold, these men have gone astray into the vacant and blind simplicity of their 
own being, and they seek for blessedness in bare nature; for they are so simply 
and so idly united with the bare essence of their souls, and with that wherein God 
always is, that they have neither zeal, nor cleaving to God, neither from without, 
nor from within.209 
 
We should recall Climacus’ story of the robber—mystics prior to Dante generally did not 
consider the possibility that a contemplative could be in such grave error.  Here, Johann is 
affirming what mystics before Dante had denied; Johann claims that mystics can be in grave 
error. 
Johann elsewhere writes of entering the simplicity of one’s own being as a necessary step 
in the mystical task; even a good man who does not become “inward and simple” will not attain 
to union with God.210  In the final stage of mystical attainment as described in the Seven Rungs, 
Johann claims that all “modalities, including the three persons of the trinity, become one in the 
modeless and unknown divine essence.”211  To this, we should compare the Pilgrim’s final 
vision, in which all that seemed separated was bound together.212  Such an experience is not 
easily distinguished from an experience described as maximally simple (i.e. not divided into any 
parts).  The error these men make, presumably upon attaining some mystical experience, is that 
they believe themselves perpetually unified with God.213  To have an experience wherein one 
could make such mistake must be a profound thing in itself.  What has gone wrong in those who 
commit such an error?  Predictably, the error is partially attributable to lack of humility, in 
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Johann’s view, they “think themselves set above God’s commandments and His Church.”214  But 
this is not all that has gone wrong.  In the quoted section above, we read that they lack zeal and 
cleaving to God.  Their error, then, is explicitly that in casting themselves as entirely unified with 
God, they have no desire for God, any more than a person can have desire for themselves.  They 
have not “sought God through active Love,” and because of their union, falsely claim to be 
“beyond love.”215 
 To put Johann’s excoriation of such mystics in context, no other mystics of the Medieval 
Period prior to this point had such harsh things to say about their fellows.  As the terrible 
Trecento progressed, however, it became more common for mystics to do so; nevertheless, 
Johann was the first mystic to have concerned himself with error on the mystical path.   As we 
saw in the previous section, it was commonly thought to be enough guard against sin to simply 
live under the strictures of a convent or monastery.  The notion that a contemplative could go 
wrong, especially so wrong as to “die like mad dogs…and go to the eternal flames,”216 was new 
in mystical writing, and could have no theoretical basis in the view espoused by Origen, 
Climacus, and Bernard, that sin could be avoided by appropriate ascetic practices.  Johann seems 
to be saying otherwise, and in so claiming, he agrees with Dante, whose theory of sin allows for 
such error among contemplatives.  As we saw in the section on Dante’s mysticism, one apparent 
purpose of Inferno (from the perspective of it being part of a mystical itinerary) is to show the 
many ways in which human beings can pervert their God-given love and thus fall into sin.  It is 
not clear that Johann is accusing his targets in this passage of having committed any of the 
usually-recognized sins (e.g. gluttony, lust, sloth, etc.), though his forecast of the consequence of 
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their error (dying like mad dogs and going to eternal flames) seems to suggest they have 
committed a grievous sin, one that is partially caused by just that which causes sin in Dante’s 
scheme: perverted love.  Just as the sinners in Inferno have misdirected their love, or failed by 
loving too much or too little, so these false men in Johann’s text have both misdirected their love 
towards a false unity, and they have loved God too little.  Of the authors recognized as 
exclusively mystics of the Medieval Period (Dante is both poet and mystic), Johann’s 
denunciation, which was probably written in the 1360s, is the first to suggest that perverted love 
can lead to such grievous error on the mystical path.  But he could only do so with an innovative 
theory of sin such as the one presented by Dante.217 
 Julian of Norwich is another mystic perhaps influenced by the Divina Commedia.  Before 
we get to analysis of Julian’s mysticism and the manner in which it seems to have been 
influenced by Dante, it is again necessary to take a moment to answer the question of readership.  
Like Johann, we know little about Julian’s life—but unlike Johann, the only source we have for 
her biography is her own writings.  The generally accepted year of her birth, 1342, is based on 
her description of the circumstances of her visions, which, she says, happened in 1373 when she 
was thirty years old, occurring in the midst of what those around her thought would be a fatal 
illness.  Andrea Dickens speculates that she had been educated at the convent school in Carrow, 
but the only evidence of this is the proximity of the school to Norwich and the fact that she was 
obviously literate and conversant with theological literature.218  Her descriptions of the events 
surrounding her illness, and the treatment she received, suggest she was either a member of a 
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privileged class, or already an anchoress.219  Norwich was, at the time, the second most 
populated city in England and was a bustling trading center.220  During Julian’s illness, she 
received a series of sixteen visions, and was miraculously healed.  She recorded these visions 
with little commentary in a work she titled A Vision Shewed by the Goodenes of God to a 
Devoute Woman.  This text has come to be known as the Short Text.  In 1393, after two decades 
of reflection, she wrote a long commentary to her visions, titled A Revelation of Love, sometimes 
called the Long Text, as it contains most of the Short Text plus a great deal of new theology, 
mystical and otherwise.221  The Long Text is the one primarily studied by scholars, as it is 
thought to contain Julian’s mature reflections on her experiences, and thus it is the Long Text 
with which we will be primarily concerned. 
 Given how little we know of Julian’s life, it is not possible to know for certain whether 
she had ever read anything of Dante.  Again, at best, a cumulative argument can be made in 
favor of the position that she had read at least some of Dante’s work.  As we saw in the 
discussion of Johann, above, the Divina Commedia probably first entered England in the 
1370s.222  Dante’s work achieved popularity in England earlier than in Spain or even parts of 
Italy thanks in part to the efforts of Geoffrey Chaucer, who admired Dante as a poet.223  In all, 
five complete manuscripts of the Divina Commedia are known to exist in England, along with an 
unknown number of fragments.224  This evidence, together with the fact that Julian was 
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obviously well-educated, seems sufficient to make a claim that it is possible Julian had read at 
least some of the Divina Commedia.  If she had read the Divina Commedia, she would have done 
so after her visions of 1373.  But it was after these visions that she joined the convent of St. 
Julian, during which period she would likely have had access to reading material.  Given the 
development of Julian’s thought evident in the period between the short and the long text, it is 
clear she spent some time studying materials relevant to the content of her visions. 
 The similarity in Julian’s thought to Dante’s focuses specifically on the nature of sin.  
Julian’s Long Text can be seen as an attempt to come to grips with a single question.  On the one 
hand, Julian believes, based on her daily life, that sin is real.  But in her visions, she receives 
information about the nature of sin that startles her in that it seems to contradict exactly what her 
day-to-day experiences tell her.  Specifically, in her visions, Christ or God (it is sometimes 
unclear who is speaking) tell her that “sin is no deed,”225 suggesting that sin is in some way 
unreal, but then that “sin behoveth,”226 suggesting that sin has some part to play in the divine 
order.  Finally, she learns that “sin is nought but a want of good,”227 confirming once again that 
sin is essentially unreal.  It has been thought that Julian was primarily driven to compose the 
Long Text due to the tension between her daily experience and church dogma on the one hand, 
and her visions on the other.228  On the one hand, she has the authority of Church teaching and 
her own personal experience, as well as one of the sayings from her own vision, to support the 
view that sin is real.  On the other hand, other sayings within her visions seem to support the 
opposite conclusion, that sin is not real.  How will she resolve the tension? 
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 The background of this tension within her visions, and the visual and aural information 
that surrounds it, only serves to heighten the conflict.  At the end of her last vision, Julian 
perceives (much like Dante) the love of God as a great light, residing in the midst of the soul, 
and she sees in that moment the rightness of everything, even of the feebleness of human will.229  
Previous to this vision, she has seen Christ at the very bottom of all sin, a curious juxtaposition 
of images that she finds at first difficult to explain.230  She has also seen that “all manner of 
things shall be well,” which she takes to mean that, literally, everything is exactly as it is 
supposed to be—everything is well.231  In her visions of God, she confronts a being in whom is 
no anger, no rage, only never ending love.232  Denys Turner has noticed a similarity in these 
points to Dante’s cosmology and mystical theology.233  Hell is, for Dante, a place created by 
primal love,234 a place that, while cut off from the love of God, must nevertheless exist as an 
expression of that Love—an idea reflected in Julian’s perceiving the face of Christ at the bottom 
of all sin.235  The inhabitants of hell have chosen their abode, by choosing a distorted image of 
heaven, and it is this distorted image that rules their lives.236  Similarly, for Julian, sin is the 
rejection of God, the perversion of love.  In Turner’s view, for both Dante and Julian, love does 
not wage war on sin, only sin wages war, while love remains in its own peace, ultimately 
unaffected.237  Indeed, in the final cantos of Paradiso, it is hard to imagine that hell is of any 
disturbance at all.  In this, the combat between sin and love is one-sided, both in the sense that it 
is being waged only by sin, but also in the sense that sin has no hope of prevailing.  Similarly, for 
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Julian, sin can be of no consequence to the infinite love of God.  Sin is “no deed” because, 
though as human creatures we are bound to perceive things somewhat in the distorted manner of 
Dante’s sinners most of the time, God is nevertheless truly within everyone, and it is we who 
choose not to behold His image.  Sin is only real from our limited human point of view, and one 
that we ourselves choose.238 
 While I agree with Turner’s view, I wish to carry the argument a step farther.  Recall that 
God has told Julian that “sin behoveth,” that is, that sin has some kind of conveniens, or “fit 
place” in the universe.  As we have seen above, Turner explains this “fit place” with respect to 
Dante in a cosmological sense: in order for God to truly love his creatures, he must allow them 
their own choice, including the choice to reject His love and dwell in their own distortion.  While 
this respects the fit place of sin in Dante’s cosmology, it does not fully appreciate the fit place of 
sin in either Julian’s or Dante’s mystical theology.  The pilgrim, as we have seen above, receives 
illumination from seeing the many sinners and hearing their deformed narratives.  He has 
learned, of the many possible images, which are definitely not proper images of God, and which 
(lust) are closer than others (betrayal).  As one who seeks out the mystery of God, who seeks to 
behold what Julian also later beholds, the pilgrim must undergo this preliminary.  Dante, for 
reasons already discussed, saw it as necessary to place Inferno on the mystical itinerary.  Julian 
has not consciously composed an itinerary, having presumably recorded, without embellishment, 
visions beyond her conscious control.  It is nevertheless interesting that she beholds two visions 
of hell. 
 Of the first, she writes that: 
For if afore us were laid all the pains in Hell and in Purgatory and in Earth--death 
and other--and sin, we should rather choose all that pain than sin.  For sin is so 
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vile and so greatly to be hated that it may be likened to no pain which is not sin.  
And to me was shewed no harder hell than sin.239 
 
This vision is entirely abstract, she sees (perhaps in the sense of “understands”) all the pain in the 
universe, and sees in the same sense that it would be preferable to take on that pain than abide in 
sin.  Her preference is because she perceives that sin disorients one from God, though she only 
truly learns this lesson in an episode that recalls the final canto of Inferno.  She confronts Satan 
himself: 
After this the Fiend came again with his heat and with his stench, and gave me 
much ado, the stench was so vile and so painful, and also dreadful and travailous.  
Also I heard a bodily jangling, as it if had been of two persons; and both, to my 
thinking, jangled at one time as if they had holden a parliament with a great 
business; and all was soft muttering, so that I understood nought that they said.240 
 
In contrast to the abstract vision of the pains of hell and purgatory, this is a visceral and concrete 
image.  Like Dante’s Satan, whose fiends pervert language, this Satan cannot speak intelligibly, 
making only a “soft muttering” and a “bodily jangling.”  And like the quite literal turning-point 
that Satan presents for the Pilgrim, Julian experiences a reorientation of her life in this 
confrontation: 
And I thought to myself, saying: Thou hast now great business to keep thee in the 
Faith for that thou shouldst not be taken of the Enemy: wouldst thou now from 
this time evermore be so busy to keep thee from sin, this were a good and 
sovereign occupation.241 
 
With the stench of the Fiend departing, so does her illness, and she wakes an apparently changed 
person, one with a “great business.”  Just as the pilgrim can only truly begin the journey he 
wished to undertake from the beginning (i.e. to Purgatory) after confronting Satan, so Julian’s 
illness, both physical and spiritual, is finally resolved by her own confrontation.  The final 
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chapters of the Long Text, which come immediately after her vision of Satan and which consist 
entirely of commentary, resolve (or seem to resolve, in her view) the conflict that had seemed to 
loom so large at the start of the text between the two views of sin.  Julian herself has been on her 
own journey between the Short and Long Texts, and it is apparently the case that she obtains her 
end only through the confrontation with the Fiend, which teaches her, as she says, to fasten her 
heart upon God.242  If Julian has not consciously composed a mystical itinerary, she has, by the 
time of the composition of the Long Text, recognized that the confrontation with Satan was 
necessary before she could truly understand the mystery of divine love—a match for Dante’s 
similar recognition that the journey through Inferno is necessary to the Pilgrim 
in the itinerary of the Divina Commedia. 
 Of the mystics to be examined in this section, none has more clearly interpolated an 
episode analogous to Inferno on the mystical itinerary than Ignatius of Loyola, and with this brief 
discussion of him, we come to the great Spanish mystics of the 16th century.  His primary work 
to be examined is The Spiritual Exercises.  As a book of exactly what the title suggests (i.e. 
spiritual exercises), it was attacked by conservative theologians of the day, for a number of 
reasons, most especially because it (in short) granted too much power to individuals in the laity 
to determine the course of their own spiritual lives.243  The power behind this power, so to speak, 
was nothing other than imagination.  Anti-Jesuit theologians feared the power of the imagination 
that might be set loose by the exercises.  Michael Sluhovsky summarizes the manner in which 
the exercises were supposed to work thus: 
The practice of spiritual exercises...was based upon an anthropological-cognitive 
theory, Aristotelian-Augustinian in its origins.  According to this theory, there are 
three different spirits (or instincts) active within the human soul--divine, natural, 
and angelic--and the latter is further divided between activities that result from 
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fallen angels...and those that result from the activities of good angels.  All these 
spirits move within the soul and activate it continuously in different intensities 
and tonalities, thus creating a large variety of effects...through divine grace, 
intellectual cognition, and methodic exercises...one learns how to differentiate 
among these spirits and to discern their impacts, thus enabling the imposition of 
order on their incessant disorder.244 
 
Similar mechanisms might be said to underlie the efficacy of narrative poetry.  Like the 
exercises, Dante’s epic takes the reader on a journey of the imagination and invites the reader to 
examine his own life in the context of the journey of the pilgrim.  As such, the Spiritual 
Exercises is often remarked to have been nothing all that new.245  The theology was largely 
mainstream Catholic in the shadow of the early Reformation, though perhaps tempered with 
ideas reminiscent of the heretical Alumbrados (a sect of heretical Spanish mystics who believed 
in the guidance of the Holy Spirit in every person).246  The notion of lay devotion, and of 
imaginal exercises, had already been broached by the Devotio Moderna of Thomas à Kempis 
(1380-1471) and the Vita Christi of Ludolf of Saxony (1295-1378), respectively.247  As 
mentioned above, however, one episode in the Spiritual Exercises is not to be found in any of 
these currently recognized sources.248  That episode is one in which the exerciser imagines 
herself in hell.  Like Dante’s pilgrim, she does not imagine the punishments of hell applying to 
herself, but rather, she sees them happening to others, though she is to pray for a deep “sense of 
the pain which the lost suffer.”249  The exerciser is to engage the senses so as to experience in 
imagination the torments those in hell suffer.250  Similarly, Dante’s vivid descriptions cannot 
help but conjure something of those torments in the imagination of his readers.  A further 
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similarity of note between this meditation and Inferno is that this episode occurs early in the 
program of the exercises, just after the contemplative has undertaken practices to bring herself to 
full understanding of the depth and nature of her own sin.  Like the pilgrim who awakes in the 
dark wood, suddenly aware of the depth of his own spiritual trouble, so the contemplative 
practices exercises first to recognize the depth of her own spiritual trouble.  And just as the 
pilgrim immediately travels to hell, so is a meditation on hell the very next point for the 
contemplative following the program of the Spiritual Exercises.  Both the exercises and Dante’s 
poem engage the imagination to bring about a change in the contemplative.  A reader of Dante’s 
poem puts herself in the place of the pilgrim, and through Dante’s vivid descriptions, she 
visualizes what the Pilgrim experiences.  Similarly, a contemplative who undertakes Ignatius’ 
exercises uses imagination to visualize her own spiritual situation, and then the torments of hell. 
 While the meditation on hell Ignatius prescribes takes less time to read than does the 
Pilgrim’s journey through Inferno, the goals of the meditation and the Pilgrim’s journey are 
comparable.  Ignatius phrases the goal in a curious manner: “…if, because of my faults I forget 
the love of the eternal Lord, at least the fear of these punishments will keep me from falling into 
sin.”251  On a casual reading, nothing more seems to be implied than that this meditation is a 
stopgap measure, so that if the exerciser becomes unmindful of the love of God, she will not 
lapse into sin.  Nevertheless, implicit in this reading is the idea that cognizance of the love of 
God is sufficient to guard against sin.  It may be that Ignatius has nothing more in mind than that 
such cognizance will keep the exerciser from sin, but it is also possible that he has something 
similar to Julian of Norwich’s analysis of sin in mind.  Some hint that this latter possibility may 
be correct is found later in the exercises, when the exerciser is to pray for understanding of the 
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Ten Commandments and the nature of the seven deadly sins, not merely the strength either to 
observe or avoid them, respectively,252 suggesting that Loyola’s goal is similar to Dante’s, in that 
images of Hell are supposed to enlighten the exerciser and provide her with just the 
understanding of sin that is the apparent purpose of Inferno.  Some further hint of a similarity is 
underlying theory between Ignatius and Dante is to be found in Ignatius discussion of spiritual 
consolation, which occurs 
…when an interior movement is aroused in the soul, by which it is inflamed with 
love of its Creator and Lord, and as a consequence, can love no creature on the 
face of the earth for its own sake, but only in the Creator of the all….I call 
consolation every increase of faith, hope, and love, and all interior joy that invites 
and attracts to what is heavenly and to the salvation of one’s soul by filling it with 
peace and quiet in its Creator and Lord.253 
 
It may seem strange that Ignatius says that the exerciser, upon receiving consolation, can 
love no creature for its own sake, but only for (the sake of) God.  He clearly cannot mean that no 
creature is worthy of love, since one is to love creatures for the sake of God who created all of 
them, and since consolation is an increase of love (along with faith and hope).  One possible 
means of making sense of this passage is by understanding the relationship of God’s love to sin 
as developed by Julian of Norwich and prefigured in Dante.  Just as God is, for both Dante and 
Julian, perfect love beyond human conception, so the mystic who has a direct experience of God 
has a direct experience of that love.  Ignatius, then, in saying that one who is granted spiritual 
consolation can love no creature for “its own sake,” is saying that the person who succeeds in 
these exercises has love that is not human love.  Rather, it has transformed into divine love, 
where it becomes obvious that the distortions of sin can hold no power.  This seems to be the 
meaning of spiritual consolation.  Similarly, in writing of the opposite of consolation—spiritual 
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desolation—Ignatius establishes a dual image, where the image of consolation is whole and 
perfect, while the image of desolation is “low and earthly, restlessness rising from many 
disturbances and temptations which lead to want of faith, want of hope, want of love.”254  This 
duality calls to mind just the duality between sin and God’s love that is present in comparison of 
Inferno to the final cantos of Paradiso, and in Julian’s analysis of the relationship of sin to God’s 
love.  While experiencing desolation, one is little separated from the day-to-day condition of life, 
when, unconscious of the presence of God in the soul, one is all-too-easily drawn to “low and 
earthly” things.  This existence, divided as it is between self and the object of the self’s desire, is 
by its nature broken and distorted.  Only in the wholeness of God, as described so eloquently in 
the final canto of Paradiso, is there no longer any distortion.  These descriptions of consolation 
and desolation occur in the section in which Ignatius describes in more depth the principles on 
which the exercises are based; he expects the exerciser to experience both consolation and 
desolation.  As such, these two states, these two images of how the soul can be, are real and 
tangible to the exerciser.  Like Dante’s sinners, the exerciser is presented a choice between the 
images—though there is little doubt which image Ignatius wants the exerciser, or Dante wants 
the reader, to choose.  “In time of desolation,” he writes, “we should never make any change, but 
remain firm and constant in the resolution and decision which guided us the day before the 
desolation, or in the decision we adhered in the preceding consolation.255  It is perhaps the very 
point of the exercises that the exerciser learn to have faith in the image presented in times of 
consolation, just as Julian could not remain in the state of beholding the infinite peace, light, and 
love of God forever—and neither, presumably, could Dante.  By interposing an episode wherein 
the exerciser endures a journey to hell, Ignatius offers the first mystical itinerary written purely 
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as an itinerary in which an episode analogous to Inferno occurs.  His doing so is prefigured, 
perhaps, in Julian’s vision of the Fiend, but more especially and exactly by Dante’s Inferno. 
 Another of the great Spanish mystics of the sixteenth century, Teresa of Avila, put an 
episode analogous to Inferno on her mystical itinerary, The Spiritual Castle.  Compared to 
Johann and Julia, we know a lot about Teresa’s life.  Scholars have been able to uncover several 
of her influences, most notably early Spanish mystical writings in the Dionysian tradition, thanks 
in part to the fact that the Dionysian corpus had been made available in Spanish a generation 
before Teresa’s.  These translations may be among the “many good books” that Teresa claims to 
have read in her childhood.256  But scholarly focus has tended to emphasize the end of the 
mystical path in Teresa’s writings—a fact that is not surprising, as it is typically at the end that 
the mystery that is of most concern to an individual mystic is finally revealed.257  The same 
pattern haunts scholarship on Dante’s relationship to mysticism, most of which is focused on 
Paradiso.  Despite this biased pattern, analysis of the beginning of mystical itineraries reveals 
how the author envisions the process of becoming a contemplative.  Without this initial 
transformation, there can be no hope that any individual will succeed in attaining the final stages 
of mystical progress, since the earliest will not have been attempted.  Arguably, then, the 
transformation from layperson to contemplative is at least as important as any other 
transformation that may be thought to occur on the mystical path. 
As the title of the work suggests, Teresa likens the soul258 to a castle with many mansions 
nestled one into another like the rings of a target or the layers of an onion.  Of this castle, she 
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says that there are “many rooms” within each of the mansions, and it is impossible to describe 
them all.259  In the “center, in the very midst of them all, is the principle chamber in which God 
and the soul hold their most secret intercourse.”260  The erotic overtones of the phrase “most 
secret intercourse” should not be ignored, as such phrases appear throughout Teresa’s writings, 
most apparently in the vision, famously captured by Bernini in the Church of Santa Maria della 
Vittoria: 
I saw an angel close by me, on my left side, in bodily form...I saw in his hand a 
long spear of gold, and at the iron's point there seemed to be a little fire.  He 
appeared to me to be thrusting it at times into my heart, and to pierce my very 
entrails; when he drew it out, he seemed to draw them out also, and to leave me 
all on fire with a great love God.  The pain was so great, that it made me moan; 
and yet so surpassing was the sweetness of this excessive pain, that I could not 
wish to be rid of it.261 
 
The language of desire is suffused throughout Teresa’s writings, and like Dante’s Pilgrim, her 
itinerary is the story of the transformation of desire.  She begins by describing those who are 
without the castle walls: 
Just so, there are souls so infirm and accustomed to think of nothing but earthly 
matters, that there seems no cure for them.  It appears impossible for them to 
retire into their own hearts; accustomed as they are to be with the reptiles and 
other creatures which live outside the castle, they have come at last to imitate 
their habits.  Though these souls are by their nature so richly endowed, capable of 
communion even with God Himself, yet their case seems hopeless.  Unless they 
endeavor to understand and remedy their most miserable plight, their minds will 
become, as it were, bereft of movement, just as Lot's wife became a pillar of salt 
for looking backwards in disobedience to God's command.262 
 
Such souls she describes as “bereft of movement” are surely incapable of the journey of the 
Pilgrim, and this inability is precisely their undoing.  Being incapable of movement, they are 
incapable of transformation.  If there is any doubt that transformation, and transformation of 
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desire, is the major theme of her itinerary, that doubt is dispelled when she later likens the soul to 
a silkworm that works to become fat, spins it’s cocoon, dies, and is reborn a beautiful white 
butterfly.263  Teresa explains that this transformation is the central and most important change the 
contemplative undergoes in her itinerary, the change towards which all preliminary training has 
aimed: 
Forward then, my daughters!  Hasten over your work and build the little cocoon.  
Let us renounce self-love and self-will, care for nothing earthly, do penance, pray, 
mortify yourselves, be obedient, and perform all the other good works of which 
you know.  Act up to your light; you have been taught your duties.  Die!  Die as 
the silkworm does when it has fulfilled the office of its creation, and you will see 
God and be immersed in His greatness, as the little silkworm is enveloped in its 
cocoon.264 
 
The imagery of transformation she chooses is not the same as Dante’s, but the scaffolding of her 
itinerary is remarkably similar.  She starts with those outside the castle walls who have no 
apparent interest in travelling to the interior of the castle, and says of them that they are 
incapable of motion.  She next describes those who have at least become cognizant of the castle, 
who “think about their souls every now and then,”265 and it is these individuals, no less than the 
ones who take no notice of the castle at all, who are in dire circumstances.  Of such souls, she 
writes “No night can be so dark, no gloom nor blackness can compare to its obscurity.  Suffice it 
to say that the sun in the center of the soul, which gave it such splendour and beauty, is totally 
eclipsed.”266  These souls are similar to the Pilgrim, in that they are lost in darkness and mired in 
sin, though they have one advantage over those who take no notice of the castle: they have a 
chance to recognize their state, and hence make progress towards the interior of the castle.267  
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They begin in the basements of the first mansion, and must confront the images of mortal sin.268  
Teresa relates the story of a woman who was granted a vision of this sin, the result of which was 
that the “Lord revealed the result of a mortal sin, and who said she thought no one who realized 
its effects could ever commit it, but would suffer unimaginable torments to avoid it.”269  These 
passages occur in the first two chapters of The Interior Castle, which are each longer 
examinations of, and meditations on, sin.  For Teresa, once a person has recognized that, so to 
speak, she is in the dark wood, she must confront the horror and ugliness of sin.  Her instructions 
are explicit that each contemplative must take up such an examination, which must include each 
of the rooms of the castle, including those in which the horrors of sin dwell.270  In examining sin, 
the soul will gain “self-knowledge.”  All of this sounds exactly like the lessons learned by the 
Pilgrim in the dark wood and then in hell, where he must first recognize the state of his own soul, 
and then confront the images of sin so as to gain illumination and hence motivate a re-orientation 
toward Purgatory, and ultimately, God.  The Pilgrim is transformed in the course of Inferno, 
literally changing direction at the moment of the most horrible confrontation with Lucifer, 
surrounded by those sinners who are bereft entirely of any power of motion—which is exactly as 
Teresa describes them.  Interestingly, it is lack of ability to move towards Purgatory that so 
worries the Pilgrim; the function of the three beasts encountered in the first canto of Inferno, is 
precisely to stop the Pilgrim from moving along his desired path. 
 By contrast, the most studied and well-known influence on Teresa, Francisco Osuna 
(1492-1540), adopted the much more conventional approach we saw taken by Bernard towards 
sin.  Osuna does speak of error, but says that “we speak of imperfections or faults in people who 
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already are deeply intimate with God and as such their defects are better than our ordinary 
perfections and are called imperfections relative to a more perfect state.”271  For Osuna, sin is not 
real,272 but this implies, in an analysis that cannot help but remind us of Bernard’s, that: 
As the power to sin is no power at all but a weakening of it, and as to know how 
to do evil is knowing how to err and not be right, so we say that knowledge of evil 
is not knowledge at all but ignorance, stupidity, or better yet, devilish cleverness 
and malice....And you must understand that the more earthly knowledge you 
hoard, the better your cracked vessel will contain it, for knowledge of the world is 
unlike wisdom of God and he who vehemently contends with the world is the 
wise person.273 
 
Like Bernard, Osuna advises the contemplative not to seek after knowledge of sin or evil, as to 
do so can only lead to ignorance.  Osuna’s principle influence on Teresa is his stunningly 
incisive understanding of interior prayer, but he cannot be a source of influence for Teresa in 
how she handles the question of sin and the transformation of desire.  Like Dante, she treats of 
human beings lost in the dark wood, who must be illuminated by an examination of the distortion 
of their own souls, a concept she explains by way of a metaphor of the rooms of the castle being 
disordered.274   Indeed, given Osuna’s recognized influence on Teresa’s mystical theology, and 
the suspicion her mysticism aroused among male clergy interested in her experience and 
writings, it is remarkable that she broke so clearly with Osuna in her treatment of the subject of 
sin on the mystical path,275 and she must have had a powerful reason to do so.  It is possible that 
she took some cue from Garcias de Cisneros’ (1455-1510) Exercitatorio de la Vida Espiritual 
(published in 1500), aimed as it was at the laity, in her description of those outside the castle.  
Importantly, however, Cisneros does not engage in any examination of sin, or recommendation 
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of the same.276  Indeed, the popularity of Osuna’s work, and the similarity of his attitude toward 
sin with those of the itineraries reviewed in the last section is evidence of the continuing 
endurance of Bernard’s position: sin is not to be investigated.  Teresa’s insistence otherwise was 
likely another source of worry among the clergy at large.  In 1543, for example, Magdalena de la 
Cruz had attracted a large following due to her apparently mystical visions, only to confess to 
fraud and possession by the devil.277  Many were suspicious that women could resist being led 
astray by the devil in prayer unguided by a male member of the clergy,278 and certainly the fact 
that a female mystic advocated an examination of sin for female contemplatives only fanned the 
flames of this suspicion.  Teresa had many reasons to refrain from advising contemplatives to 
undertake an examination of sin, and that she did so suggests she had a powerful model in mind, 
one in which such an examination is necessary along the mystical path. 
If we accept that, from at least some theological views, it is entirely correct for a mystic 
to engage in an examination of sin, then it is clear (again, in those same views) that Dante has 
done something right in having his pilgrim descend through the depths of hell.  As we saw in the 
previous section, his was the first work that could be read as a mystical itinerary to recommend 
such an episode as the journey through Inferno.  As such, he is to be credited with originating the 
idea that examination of sin can be a source of wisdom for the mystic, and hence Teresa’s work 
owes a debt to Dante.  Again, it cannot be conclusively proven that Teresa had ever read the 
Divina Commedia, but to return for a moment to her statement that her father kept many “good 
books” and encouraged her to read them, we can appreciate that it is likely she had read it.  The 
Divina Commedia was popular in Spain from the end of the thirteenth century well into the 
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seventeenth century, and especially as a manifesto of the Catholic vision of the order of the 
cosmos, it was popular among devout Catholics in the face of the threat posed by the 
Reformation. 
 
Section V: Conclusion 
 Dante should be recognized not merely as a poet, but as a mystic in his own right, and 
one who formulated significant innovations on the standard mystical itinerary of the Medieval 
Period.  Dante’s innovations caught on among mystics who came after him, and in this thesis, we 
have touched upon a few instances in which later mystics seem to have incorporated Dante’s 
ideas, which stand in sharp contrast to the ideas of mystics before circulation of the Divina 
Commedia.  As such, Dante is at least partly responsible for a reorientation in the course of 
mystical thought itself.  Departing from the tripartite scheme of purgation, illumination, and 
union, Dante created a different scheme in which he interpolated an episode in which the 
contemplative, allegorized as the Pilgrim, undertakes a detailed examination of sin.  At the end 
of this episode, the contemplative confronts the epitome of evil within herself and undergoes a 
reorientation towards the divine.  This new episode in the standard mystical itinerary is a result 
of Dante’s understanding of the role of desire on the mystical journey.  Dante’s theme in the 
Divina Commedia is primarily one of transformation of the human person, and in particular, 
transformation of desire from earthly or carnal desire into divine or spiritual desire, and in 
Dante’s view, it is this process alone by which a person can attain to direct experience of God. 
 Dante’s central message about the transformation of desire is a single idea beyond easy 
articulation; mystical thought and experience in general is characterized by its ineffability.  
Dante, perhaps reflecting on the difficulties of articulating the true nature of sin, presents it in its 
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myriad forms throughout Inferno, and only later, after having spent some time receiving 
illumination along with the pilgrim, do we learn that sin has a single source—perverted love.  As 
theological doctrine, we learn this on the steps of Purgatory.  But as a poetic image, this ineffable 
idea is figured in the genuinely hair-raising vision of Lucifer at the very close of Inferno.  
Without that vision, something about the nature of Dante’s doctrine would elude us.  However, 
the essence of Dante’s mysticism lies in the image of his love for Beatrice transforming into love 
of God, and all that this love and transformation entail for the mystical itinerary.  For mystics 
before Dante such as Climacus or Bernard, desire was conceived as a manifold feature of human 
beings, some parts of which must be extinguished before the contemplative may hope for success 
on the mystical path.  Those earlier mystics’ understanding of the nature of sin as essentially 
external to the contemplative is incompatible with Dante’s understanding of the role of desire as 
the engine of progress on the mystical journey.  For Dante, desire was a singular feature of 
human beings, and if the contemplative extinguished earthly desire rather than transformed it, 
she would lose an opportunity to make progress on the mystical path.  At the same time, 
transformation of desire is, for Dante, entirely necessary, as sin and the kinds of desire it 
occasions distort or pervert the love that is present in all human beings, even those who sin.  This 
innovative understanding of the nature of sin was yet another reason for the interpolation of 
Inferno on the mystical itinerary.  As the contemplative proceeds through the layers of hell, 
viewing each of the sins in turn, she learns about the distortion caused by sin, and, indirectly, 
about the undistorted image of heaven.  These innovations entered into the writings of Christian 
mystics shortly after circulation of the Divina Commedia, altering and enriching the ideas of 
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